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THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MENS
REA: ANOTHER STAB AT A WORKABLE
INTEGRATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL
CULPABILITY INTO CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
“It is a poor legal system indeed which is unable to differentiate
between the law breaker and the innocent victim of circumstances so
that it must punish both alike.” 1 This observation summarizes the
pervasive flaw with the present standards of vicarious liability used to
impose criminal liability on organizations. As in civil lawsuits,
corporate criminal liability at the federal level and in many states is
imposed using a strict respondeat superior standard: corporations are
criminally liable for the wrongdoing of their agents committed within
the scope of their authority for the benefit of the corporation.2 The
remaining jurisdictions follow some variation of the Model Penal
Code standard, a narrower approach than the federal rule, finding
corporate liability only where the board of directors or other highlevel managers “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated” the offense.3
These liability standards, which rely on imputing mental states to
individual agents, are fatally over- and underinclusive because they
1

Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 45

(1957).
2 See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing cases
that employ the strict respondeat superior standard); see also Christopher R. Green, Punishing
Corporations: The Food Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB.
L. REV. 197, 200–02 (2008) (summarizing this standard, the “liberal” rule, and listing the
jurisdictions applying it).
3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962); see also Green, supra note 2, at 204–06
(summarizing the MPC standard and listing the jurisdictions applying it).
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fail, without justification, to differentiate between the
nonblameworthy organizations and those which are genuinely
culpable. Consider, for example, the following two circumstances:
Corporation A employs purchasing agent X, a lower-echelon
agent, who personally accepts bribes from a foreign manufacturer, F,
in exchange for his promise to purchase F’s product. Assume a person
is criminally liable for knowingly accepting bribes of this sort. A has
extensive policies in place prohibiting such practices, and provides
annual compliance training to all purchasing agents. A also exhibits a
track record of diligently supervising and controlling its agents to
ensure compliance. There is no evidence that X’s superiors knew or
had reason to know of X’s conduct. X simply took exceptional efforts
to cover up his conduct and slipped through the cracks. Assuming that
the prosecution can locate X and prove his knowledge, despite X’s
apparently personal motivations and A’s lack of genuine culpability
in the offense, A would be vicariously criminally liable.
Compare Corporation B, a large, complex, highly decentralized
organization employing purchasing agent Y. Y is given a lead to
pursue a contract with Corporation F that has trickled down through
the layers of management. After months of service on the contract,
B’s accounting department accepts a check from F earmarked as a
refund for returned F products, which were actually used by B.
Essentially, the payment is nothing short of a bribe. Some
indeterminate members of senior management at B had, a year earlier,
made this arrangement with an equally unidentifiable group of
management at F. Due to standard communications disposal and
retention procedures and management’s deliberate care to obscure its
conduct, there is no paper trail or credible testimony that may be used
to trace the arrangement back to an agent at B. Assume that this is not
an isolated incident, but that B has been convicted of similar
violations in the past. Additionally, due to its lack of proper
compliance programs and its notoriety for extreme bottom-line driven
pressures on its purchasing agents, it appears to be simply indifferent
to, or actually encourages such conduct. Nonetheless, since the
prosecution cannot prove that any individual agent knowingly
accepted the illegal payments, B will escape liability.
This Note contends that the disconnect between organizational
blameworthiness and liability under the current individualistic
liability scheme warrants overhauling the standard for holding
organizations criminally liable. That organizations demonstrate
culpability independent of their individual agents has long been
recognized both in other areas of the law and competing academic
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conceptualizations of organizational criminal liability. Accordingly,
this Note builds from the existing academic models of genuine
organizational culpability and suggests a standard that uses an
approximation of the senior management mens rea (SMMR). This
SMMR should be used as a proxy for the corporate mens rea by using
both (1) subjective mental states of senior management and (2)
reasonable inferences of senior management’s culpability derived
from organizational variables commonly recognized as contributing
to organizational culpability. These variables should serve as
nonsubjective circumstantial evidence of culpability. This model,
which embodies the understanding of genuine organizational
culpability and ensures true organizational blameworthiness, can be
weaved seamlessly into the current criminal statutes in a form that
courts can more consistently understand and apply than other
academic proposals.
Part I of this Note explains the development and shortcomings of
the present standards of corporate criminal liability. Part II discusses
the theoretical underpinnings of independent organizational action
and intention in organizational theory. Part II also outlines the means
by which the law and legal scholars have incorporated the
understanding of genuine organizational culpability into models
assessing independent organizational culpability. Finally, Part II
explores the shortcomings of the prevailing academic models.
Specifically, it focuses on William Laufer’s model of constructive
corporate fault, one of the most substantively sound and practical
academic models to date. Part III advocates a new liability standard,
the SMMR, and specifically examines its implementation-based
utility when compared to Laufer’s model.
I.

THE CURRENT LIABILITY SCHEME AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

A. Development of the Current Standards of Corporate Mens Rea
An understanding of the present liability system requires an
examination of the historical development of the law to bring to light
the tension between the generally sound justifications for holding
corporations criminally liable and the defective rationale behind the
use of a respondeat superior model. Early courts struggled to
manufacture a standard for imposing criminal liability on
organizations from the predominantly individual-centered criminal
law due to the prevailing view that the corporation was merely a legal
fiction—a shell housing its individual members with no independent
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identity. 4 This view, exemplified by Chief Justice Marshall’s widelynoted position in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 5 is
that a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law,
it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it . . . .” 6 Thus, American courts borrowed from English
common law the view that a corporation is merely an aggregation of
its individual members and may act only through these members in
their individual capacities, a view entirely inconsistent with the
imputation of criminal liability. 7
Throughout the nineteenth century, the “corporation as a fiction”
view was progressively rejected as the corporation became more
dominant in American society. 8 Potentially damaging societal effects
of giant, multidivisional organizations stood in stark contrast with the
idea that a corporation was incapable of committing crime. 9 In
response, the corporation transformed from an untouchable entity to a
legal person, and “the criminal law became the state’s response to all
sorts of corporate wrongs, from the indictment of railroad companies .
. . to elaborate prosecutions of conglomerate companies . . . .”10
4 WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS 11 (2006) (discussing
the struggle of corporate criminal law to overcome the conception of personhood that was
“bounded by a methodological individualism that limit[ed] the understanding of social and
group phenomena”).
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) § 518 (1819).
6 Id. at 636; see also LAUFER, supra note 4, at 11 (“How then may a corporation be
indicted? Corporations, being incorporeal, cannot appear at the bar for trial. The state does not
charter corporations to commit crimes. To punish both the corporation and the members of the
body corporate seemed nothing less than double punishment. It was simply inconceivable that
corporations could act in ways that contravene the justification for their creation.”).
7 See 1 WILLIAM B LACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 476 (“A corporation cannot commit
treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s [sic] corporate capacity; though it’s [sic] members may,
in their distinct individual capacities.”) (footnotes omitted).
8 See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 23 (2006)
(noting that the Industrial Revolution triggered an expansion in the scale of enterprises, such
that “[b]y the latter half of the nineteenth century the major firms in almost all industries were
operating as corporations”); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 582–83 (1989) (“The fiction
theory of corporate action was seen as a failed attempt by the law to deal with corporate facts
without departing from individualistic premises.”). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to
Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367–69 (2009)
(supporting many of the classic critiques of corporate criminal liability by arguing that a
corporation is a mere fiction that cannot be punished, and that it is innocent shareholders who
are forced to bear the direct burden of criminal sanctions).
9 Laufer notes that “[w]idespread discrimination against people and localities, bribing of
legislators, stock manipulation, and formation of pools were engaged in with near impunity,”
and that the immensely powerful railroads “left many with the impression that corporations
were more powerful than the very states that regulated them.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 14.
10 Id. at 12 (citing United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1906); United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); United States v. John Kelso
Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 24 F. Cas. 972
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Regulation of corporations grew steadily through the latter part of
the nineteenth century with the growth of criminal liability and the
emergence of regulatory law. 11 Maintaining the trend, the Supreme
Court extended corporate criminal law to all crimes, including those
requiring proof of mens rea, in the seminal case of New York Central
& Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States. 12 In that case,
an employee of the railroad company gave rebates to certain
customers for shipments of sugar. 13 The lower courts convicted both
the employee and the corporation under a provision of the Elkins Act
that imposed vicarious criminal liability on a corporation for the acts
and intentions of its agents while acting within the scope of their
employment. 14
Defense counsel urged that this provision was unconstitutional
because “punish[ing] the corporation is in reality to punish the
innocent stockholders . . . depriv[ing] them of their property without
opportunity to be heard, consequently without due process of law”
and because the provision “deprive[s] the corporation of the
presumption of innocence . . . which is a part of due process . . . .” 15
In other words, the defense argued that imputation of criminal
liability amounted to a punishment of the innocent corporation and its
owners for the acts of a guilty agent.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that this
provision was not unconstitutional. The Court emphasized the need to
control corporations, which had quickly grown into enormously
powerful actors 16:
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public
policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction,
and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held
punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its
agents to whom it has entrusted authority to act . . . . [Further,
giving corporations immunity] from all punishment because
of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot

(W.D. Va. 1868)).
11 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that “[c]riminal liability, as well as the
emergence of regulatory law . . . provided some needed relief from the risks associated with the
rise of the modern corporation”).
12 212 U.S. § 481 (1909).
13 Id. § 489.
14 Id. § 490–92.
15 Id. § 492.
16 Id. § 495 (“[The law] cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business
transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate
commerce is almost entirely in their hands . . . .”).
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commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the
abuses aimed at . . . . It would be a distinct step backward to
hold that Congress cannot control [corporations] by holding
them responsible for the intent and purposes of the agents to
whom they have delegated the power to act in the premises. 17
Through this rationale, the Court articulated the enduring policy
behind criminally punishing corporations: deterring agent misconduct
by allocating risk of criminal liability to the corporation to incentivize
greater control of its agents. 18 As one commentator summarized soon
after the New York Central decision, “[c]orporate criminal
responsibility tends to prevent crime not only by influencing the
corporation’s representatives of all degrees to abstain from
conducting its business in unlawful ways, but also by influencing
those of higher or more remote degrees to restrain subordinates.” 19
This deterrence justification is as legitimate today as it was a century
ago, as “the power now wielded by corporations is both enormous
and unprecedented in human history.” 20 The criminal law thus serves
as an important mechanism to deter the damaging effects of powerful
corporate actors’ misconduct, which many commentators argue
causes significantly more harm to individuals and society than the
acts of individuals. 21
Federal law continues to embody the relatively unrestricted
attribution of agents’ mental states to the organizations. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated the generally
followed rule of organizational criminal liability under modern
federal law in United States v. Basic Construction Company. 22 In
Basic, the court affirmed a conviction under the Sherman Antitrust
Id. § 495–96.
See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16 (“The ingenious public policy that emerged in New
York Central & Hudson River Railroad shared the allocation of risks to both principal and
agent. Corporate liability deters crime; it moves risk of loss away from risk-averse officers and
directors and toward the firm; it efficiently distributes liability risk between the firm and
employees.”).
19 Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 835 (1927).
20 Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2009).
21 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 8 (stating that the costs of corporate crime
“involve not only large financial losses but also injuries, deaths, and health hazards,” that they
involve “incalculable costs of the damage done to the physical environment and the great social
costs of the erosion of the moral base of society . . . ” and, finally, that they “destroy public
confidence in business”); Beale, supra note 20, at 1482–84 (arguing that corporations are
“enormously powerful actors whose conduct often causes significant harm both to individuals
and to society as a whole,” and citing the wealth controlled by the corporations and the
monetary losses that have resulted from large-scale corporate criminal conduct).
22 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983).
17
18
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Act for bid-rigging in connection with state road paving contracts. At
trial, the defendant argued that the bid-rigging activities were
performed by low-level officials and without the knowledge or
participation of higher management, and that the company had a strict
policy against such practices. 23 The court ruled that “a corporation
may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed
by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation,
even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or express
instructions.” 24 Although the “for the benefit of the corporation”
requirement appears to provide a nexus between the interests and
intentions of the employee and those of the organization, courts have,
over time, effectively removed this requirement from the standard
entirely. 25
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) came forward with the
Model Penal Code (MPC), providing a major alternative to strict
vicarious liability. The ALI ultimately settled on three bases of
liability for corporate defendants. First, corporations are liable for
minor regulatory offenses where a clear “legislative purpose to
impose liability” is present, and the agent’s actions were “[on] behalf
of the corporation” and within the scope of his authority. 26 This
largely echoed the broad federal rule of vicarious liability except that
it provides for a “due diligence” defense allowing a corporation to
escape conviction if it can establish that a “high managerial agent
having supervisory responsibility” used due diligence to prevent the
offense. 27 Second, a corporation is liable where the offense is based
on a failure to discharge a specific duty imposed by law. 28

Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 969–70 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding an agricultural cooperative liable where an employee authorized an
expenditure from the cooperative in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme despite the fact that the
employee hid the illegal scheme from others at the company because the employee may have
been acting to further the interests of the cooperative); United States v. Automated Med. Lab.,
Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406–07 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that an agent’s conduct, which is actually or
potentially detrimental to the corporation, may be imputed to the corporation in a criminal case
if motivated at least in part by intent to benefit the corporation); United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–07 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding hotel corporation liable where a
purchasing agent threatened a supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business unless the supplier
did not contribute to a trade association, even though this was against explicit corporate policy,
both the manager and assistant manager had specifically told the purchasing agent not to
threaten suppliers, and the employee testified that he violated the instructions because of
personal anger toward the supplier).
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (1962).
27 Id. § 2.07(5).
28 Id. § 2.07(1)(b).
23
24
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The third basis, which applies to the majority of criminal offenses,
provides that corporations are liable for penal law violations (with a
few exceptions) where the “offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting [on] behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.” 29 This
standard confines the respondeat superior approach “to a narrow class
of criminal acts–those concerning high managerial agents whose acts
reflect the policy of the corporate body.” 30 This refined standard
strides toward a stronger nexus between the action and intention of
the agent and the corporation. 31 Charging the conduct of a “high
managerial agent,” defined by the MPC as “having duties of such
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the
policy of the corporation or association,” 32 to the organization may
have a greater deterrent effect because the organization can and
should be required to exercise greater control over agents in elevated
roles. And from a culpability standpoint, the actions of managerial
agents more directly embody corporate policy, values, and intention.
Thus, the acts of higher-level agents are better “reflective of the
character of the corporate body.” 33
Despite its strides toward a better normative standard, the MPC
model uses the same agent-to-organization intent attribution as the
strict respondeat superior scheme. Consequently, it reflects many
flaws of the broad federal standard, including improperly broad
liability, the difficulties in locating a culpable agent, and greater
inconsistency in administration and excessive prosecutorial
discretion. 34 Nonetheless, every jurisdiction in the United States
currently follows the federal rule, the MPC standard, or some
variation thereof. 35
Id. § 2.07(1)(c).
LAUFER, supra note 4, at 23.
31 In fact, the MPC drafters acknowledged that this rule was a partial rejection of the
federal rule in favor of a more reasonable standard for imposing liability on shareholders of the
corporation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmt. c (1962) (summarizing the rationale for
confining the liability standard to situations bearing a connection to high managerial personnel).
32 Id. § 2.07(4)(c).
33 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 25.
34 These flaws are discussed more thoroughly in Part II.B.
35 Christopher Green observes that cases from fourteen jurisdictions (Federal law,
California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin) follow
the New York Central & Hudson federal rule for corporate crime, that statutes adopt the rule in
Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, and Maine, and another eleven states (Alabama, Connecticut,
Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, the
Virgin Islands, and Wyoming) allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting any “high
managerial agent limitation.” Green, supra note 2, at 202. He notes that the remaining twenty
29
30
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B. Flaws of the Current Scheme
Establishing corporate criminal liability using vicarious liability
was flawed from the start. The New York Central Court’s decision
abounds with defective reasoning for its adoption. Despite the Court’s
sound policy justification for imposing criminal liability on
corporations, its use of strict respondeat superior attribution was
misguided. This Part discusses those flaws in depth.
1. The Flaws of Applying Respondeat Superior in Criminal Law
At the most general level, the Court’s justification is flawed
because it jumped into a respondeat superior regime without
considering its fit with the precepts of criminal law. 36 First, the
“Court[] fail[ed] to appreciate the inherently different nature of civil
and criminal law.” 37 Tort suits function primarily to compensate a
party for damage caused by another. Any resulting deterrence is often
viewed as a byproduct of the desired compensation. But criminal suits
are pursued “because of the impact a conviction will have on future
conduct by the general public.”38 Additionally, because tort liability is
commonly considered a cost of doing business, it does not carry the
moral stigma that attaches to criminal convictions 39 and is less likely
to put the firm out of business.40 Consequently, respondeat superior

jurisdictions (including Guam) have adopted MPC-type restrictive rules. Id. at 205–06.
36 See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1114–21 (1991) (describing the developments leading to a
corporate criminal law that has no intent requirement).
37 Id. at 1115.
38 Id. Another justification for the use of criminal sanctions is the retributive function,
which focuses on punishing the actor for engaging in blameworthy conduct. See infra notes 77–
82 and accompanying text.
39 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1115–16 (comparing goals and effects of tort lawsuits and
criminal actions); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry
Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53,
73 (2007) (“[C]orporate defendants, subject as they are to market pressures, may not be able to
survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 352 (1993) (“In
some instances adverse publicity alone can cause corporate devastation . . . ”). This stigma has
actually been suggested as a form of punishment. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 755–56 (1992) (noting that several
commentators have “suggested the use of court-ordered adverse publicity as a criminal sanction
against corporate offenders”).
40 See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 278 (2008) (“A conviction could have fatal consequences for business entities even
when the criminal trial ends with a modest penalty . . . [because] a variety of laws and
regulations can effectively put out of business firms convicted of a crime.”). For example,
Arthur Andersen was given a modest criminal sanction but was prohibited from serving as an
auditor for publicly traded companies as a convicted felon under SEC rules, pushing the firm
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fits well into tort law, serving to compensate the victim by providing
access to the corporation’s deep pockets, but is “anathema to the
criminal law, which . . . should focus on personal intent,” and
discouraging criminal intentions by corporate actors.41
But, the most troubling flaw in the Court’s rationale is “its failure
to consider the conceptual alternatives to broad respondeat superior as
the standard for corporate criminal liability.” 42 Pamela Bucy observes
that the Court undertook an all-or-nothing analysis, choosing to either
impose criminal liability via respondeat superior, or to forgo criminal
liability entirely. 43 The Court’s failure to explore alternatives is
understandable given the limited scope of the issue before the Court
and that the case was heard at a time when corporate criminal law was
in its infancy and its merits were still a matter of serious debate.44 But
the present ignorance of the substantive criminal law to the “subtleties
of organizational behavior that courts are now better able to identify
and appreciate” 45 is not justified, either by pragmatic or normative
concerns. Due to the progressive understanding of organizational
behavior and culpability, prosecutors, judges, and juries are
sufficiently equipped to identify and appreciate genuine
organizational culpability. 46
2. The Failure of the Current Scheme to Deter Misconduct
The respondeat superior standard also fails to deter corporate
wrongdoing adequately. It is true that the deterrent function cited as a
basis for vicarious liability may take hold in a perfect world and
under optimal organizational conditions:
Vicarious liability should align organizational incentives
(e.g., increases in payroll compensation, significant bonuses,
and promotion to higher positions in the corporation) with

out of business. Id. at 279.
41 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1116.
42 Id. at 1120.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and
an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 413 (1982) (noting that only certain classes of crimes
could be committed by corporations); Edgerton, supra note 19, at 827 (“[I]t is not yet clear that
corporations can commit all crimes; on the contrary, it is constantly assumed that they cannot;
and it is not at all clear what human action is necessary to the commission of corporate crime.”).
45 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1120.
46 See infra Part II.A–C (discussing the understanding of independent organizational
action, intention, and culpability in organizational theory, in legal doctrine and criminal
practice, and as used in proposals for liability standards embracing genuine organizational
culpability).
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corporate policies, codes, standards, and procedures that
maximize law abidance. Top management is put on notice
that the failure to align such incentives with implicit
messages to deviate from the law risks entity liability.
Successful managers must institutionalize an adequate control
system to identify deviance, exercise great care in the
delegation of significant corporate responsibility, and clearly
communicate the importance and relevance of policies, code
provisions, standards, and procedures, while defining those
acts that are within the scope of the agent’s authority. 47
As desirable as this objective appears on its face, in practice,
respondeat-superior-based liability likely creates contrary control
incentives due to its creation of constructive strict liability. 48 This
effect is best exemplified in cases where a rogue agent acts contrary
to corporate policies and well-intentioned efforts to control the
subordinate’s conduct. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corporation 49
provides an example. The purchasing agent at a Hilton hotel
threatened a supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business if the
supplier did not contribute to an association formed to attract
conventions to the region housing the hotel.50 Although the hotel
attempted to prevent this misconduct, the district court convicted it of
a violation of the Sherman Act under the federal rule. 51 The
corporation’s president testified that the purchasing agent’s actions
were contrary to the corporation’s policy, and two managers of the
hotel testified that they specifically told the agent not to threaten
suppliers. 52 Even though the corporation took reasonable measures to
control its agent’s misconduct, the corporation would still have been
liable under the respondeat superior standard. From the perspective of
a well-intentioned, diligent corporation, this is clearly an unfair
standard.
This unfairness not only creates another burden on corporations
with which they must cope, but it also harms criminal enforcement as

LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16.
Commentators frequently invoke the analogy between vicarious criminal liability for
organizations and strict liability to describe the lack of incentives for corporations to internally
control their agents’ conduct. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 36, at 1114 (“If mens rea is essential to
a fair and just criminal justice system, how did criminal liability of corporations develop without
this element? . . . [C]ourts borrowed the respondeat superior principle from tort law and applied
it to criminal law.”).
49 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
50 Id. at 1002.
51 Id. at 1004–06.
52 Id. at 1004.
47
48
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a whole because it “erodes the power of the criminal law.”53 H.L.A.
Hart posits that a majority of citizens must comply with laws if they
are to achieve their ultimate intended purpose of encouraging social
stability. 54 “Voluntary compliance will wane, however, if people view
laws as unjust, unfair, or arbitrary.” 55 Laws punishing a corporation
despite its thorough efforts to prevent misconduct have this precise
effect. Unsurprisingly, this creates an incentive for corporations to
either forgo preventative efforts or to obscure misconduct. 56
Corporations may forgo preventative efforts, for example, by
“hid[ing] the evidence, or [colluding] with the agent, to avoid their
joint and several liability.” 57 This incentive is equally present under
the MPC standard, which encourages higher-level employees to avoid
any connection with known misconduct by artificially insulating
themselves from that knowledge. 58
It can be argued that the appeal of concealing misconduct is more
theoretical than real because of the higher risk of prosecution and
increased fines under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 59 One need
Bucy, supra note 36, at 1100.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that one of “two
minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system” is that “its
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by
its officials”).
55 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1108.
56 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 16–17 (discussing the incentive to obscure and the
awareness of the problem immediately after New York Central, as corporations explored the
trade-off between compliance costs and criminal enforcement costs); Jennifer Arlen, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836
(1994):
53
54

On the one hand, increased enforcement expenditures reduce the number of agents
who commit crimes by increasing the probability of detection. . . . On the other hand,
these expenditures also increase the probability that the government will detect those
crimes that are committed, thereby increasing the corporation’s expected criminal
liability for those crimes. . . . [This may incentivize] a corporation subject to
vicarious liability [to] spend less on enforcement than it would absent vicarious
liability.
See also David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81
IOWA L. REV. 969, 970 (1996) (“[C]ommentators stress that corporations may forego [sic]
internal audits if they fear that they will be held liable for, and hence punished for, any
violations that they might uncover.”).
57 C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Yingyi Qian, Vicarious Liability Under a Negligence Rule, 15 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 305, 306 (1995).
58 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1105 (“The MPC standard encourages higher echelon
officials to insulate themselves from knowledge of corporate employee activity.”); see also infra
note 244–45 and accompanying text (discussing the recognized tendency for senior management
to, either deliberately or inadvertently, avoid positive knowledge of deviance within the lower
ranks of the organization).
59 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(e)–(g) (2010) (in assessing the
culpability of and prescribing a fine to an organizational defendant, among other factors, the
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only look to the infamous Enron accounting scandal, 60 however, to
see that this argument is naïve. Prior to the scandal, Enron
“demonstrated a leading-edge commitment to corporate ethics and
social responsibility.” 61 In 2000, shortly before the scandal surfaced,
Enron instituted a number of ethics and compliance measures,
including a corporate responsibility task force staffed by upper
management to analyze the company’s social and environmental
record, and implemented a number of programs and policies to
educate and encourage employee participation in a more responsible
and ethical practice.62 “[Enron] did more than merely produce an
ethics code and distribute it among employees. . . [and] devise ethics
training programs, produce glossy ethics material, and give
impressive multimedia presentations. It led many Fortune 500
companies with a wide variety of social and environmental initiatives
around the world.” 63
The Enron scandal demonstrates that corporations have the
capability, as Laufer describes it, to play “compliance games” where
the firm essentially puts on an artificial front of good corporate
citizenship and compliance to ward off regulatory scrutiny and
minimize the risk of liability. 64 This phenomenon can be analogized
to a moral hazard present in insurance: compliance programs, like
insurance policies do not necessarily modify the poor moral character
of the corporation (the insured), but may instead merely permit that
corporation to engage in misconduct with less risk of investigation. 65

court is advised to consider whether the organization obstructed justice; the degree to which it
accepted responsibility, reported the misconduct, and cooperated with the investigation; and
whether the organization had in place an effective compliance program at the time of the
offense); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9–28.300:
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2008) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.300
(advising federal prosecutors to consider in prosecuting organizations, among other factors, the
organization’s “timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to
cooperate,” and the existence and adequacy of compliance programs).
60 See Enron Scandal At-A-Glance, BBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2002, 16:59 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1780075.stm (summarizing the progression of the Enron
accounting scandal).
61 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 99.
62 See id. (summarizing the corporate responsibility and ethics efforts launched by Enron
shortly before the scandal).
63 Id. at 100.
64 Id. at 103 (describing the general compliance games employed by organizations).
65 See id. at 122–24 (analogizing the moral hazard possible through the use of corporate
compliance programs to that presented through the purchase of insurance contract). Regarding
corporations’ tendency to create compliance programs as a form of insurance, see id. at 121
(noting that “[w]ith some corporations—Enron and Andersen may be good examples—once
compliance and governance expenditures are made, care levels may be expected to decrease if
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And the increased odds of prosecution and the threat of a larger
sentence apparently did not stop Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, from shredding documents to conceal the accounting
fraud. 66 These instances illustrate that the deterrent function is far
from optimal under a standard of strict vicarious criminal liability.
3. Flaws of Applying Strict Liability to Corporate Misconduct
Some commentators may argue that the constructive strict-liability
treatment of corporate offenses is in line with the growth of strict
liability and a potential shift away from the link between culpability
and criminal punishment. 67 However, strict liability is generally
reserved for “public welfare offenses”: offenses of a regulatory nature
which carry relatively light monetary fines, and for which proof of
mens rea would be difficult to establish, or would impose so high a
burden on the prosecution, as to prevent adequate enforcement due to
their broad coverage. 68 The United States Supreme Court has stated
that the omission of mens rea from an offense is properly upheld
where the statute “render[s] criminal a type of conduct that a
reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public
regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or
safety.” 69
Based on this understanding of strict liability, the suggestion of
such a broad-based shift to constructive strict liability for all penal
offenses of corporations is unpersuasive. All corporate crimes simply
do not fit the mold of traditional strict liability crimes such as
environmental offenses. 70 Further, under strict vicarious liability,
liability may be imposed without any primary action by the

the consensus view emerges in the firm that those expenditures wholly protect against
liability”).
66 See Indictment at 7–8, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121
(S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318, for a description of the obstruction of justice
charge,.
67 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 39, at 747 (noting that “some commentators see the growth
of strict liability as a repudiation of the traditional link between culpability and punishment”);
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 213 (1991)
(arguing that “a theory may be on the verge of judicial acceptance that effectively severs [the
traditional] linkage between blameworthiness and criminal punishment”).
68 See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72–73 (1933)
(discussing what crimes are punishable without mens rea).
69 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
70 See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray et al., “Attempted” Environmental Crimes: A Flawed
Concept, 14 J.L. & POL. 363, 370 (1998) (“Although it is debatable whether environmental
crimes that do not threaten human health should be considered ‘public welfare offenses,’ most
environmental crimes are categorized as such.”).
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corporation, as liability is based exclusively on the secondary actions
of its agents. Given the “generally disfavored status” 71 of strict
liability statutes, that present corporate liability standards impose
strict liability is unjustified.
More troubling is that the strict liability effect respondeat superior
standard causes a failure to inquire into the genuine culpability of the
organization. 72 Our system of criminal law has traditionally used the
accused’s culpability to separate blameworthy from nonblameworthy
conduct to focus prosecutorial efforts on conduct that is most harmful
to society. 73 This culpability analysis is required to promote the
respect in the criminal law required for effective deterrence. 74 But by
using respondeat superior to assign criminal blame to corporations,
the law arbitrarily punishes corporations without any true indication
that the corporation itself was culpable for the misconduct.
This problem is best illustrated where a corporate employee acts in
a manner contrary to express corporate policy and for his own benefit
out of personal motives. For example, in Hilton Hotels, the
corporation was convicted for its purchasing agent’s threats to a
supplier despite the fact that his actions contravened corporate policy,
he was warned on two occasions against engaging in the misconduct,
71 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (noting that criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have
a “generally disfavored status”) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438
(1978)).
72 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1103 (“The critical weakness in both the traditional
respondeat superior and MPC standards of liability is that they fail to sufficiently analyze
corporate intent.”); Moore, supra note 39, at 761 (“Ultimately, the respondeat superior theory is
overinclusive because it is a theory of imputed culpability. Under a theory of imputed
culpability, what makes a corporation ‘culpable’ is not (primarily) any feature of the corporation
as such, but the mere fact that an agent committed a crime.”).
73 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 114 (1968) (“All civilized penal
systems make liability to punishment for . . . serious crime depend[] not merely on the fact that
the person to be punished has done the outward act of the crime, but on his having done it in a
certain state of . . . mind or will.”); Bucy, supra note 36, at 1106 (“The notion of mens rea thus
developed as a way of distinguishing those who should be criminally liable from those who
should not.”) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 989–90, 993, 1017
(1932))); Bucy, supra note 36, at 1106–07 (“Today, the objectives of our modern criminal
justice system focus less on ‘awarding adequate punishment for moral wrongdoing’ than on
‘protecting social and public interests.’” (quoting Sayre, supra note 73, at 1017)).
74 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 69 (1968):

If it is not thought enough of a justification that the law be fair, the argument may
seem appealing that a criminal law system cannot attract and retain the respect of its
most important constituents—the habitually law-abiding—unless it is seen to be fair.
And . . . [the] simplest . . . meaning [of fairness] is that no one should be subjected to
punishment without having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his culpability.
(emphasis in original).
see also Moore, supra note 39, at 749 (“A system that routinely punished the non-culpable
would create an intolerably high level of anxiety and apprehension, because citizens could no
longer rely on their own, voluntary efforts to avoid confrontations with the criminal law.”).
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and the agent admitted that he violated the instructions because of
“anger and personal pique toward the individual representing the
supplier.” 75 Whether the corporation could reasonably have done
anything to control the rogue agent’s conduct, aside from termination,
is unclear, which argues against the organization’s culpability. The
agent’s admission that his conduct was not undertaken with intent to
benefit the corporation removes any indication that the organization
influenced his decision in any way. Holding a corporation liable for
this conduct is reflective of the trend, noted by one court, of cases “in
which the corporation is criminally liable even though no benefit [to
the corporation] has been received in fact.”76 Not only is this unfair to
the corporation, but it may breed disrespect for the system, which
further erodes the deterrence function.
4. The Current Scheme’s Lack of Retributive Function
The current respondeat superior scheme also fails to serve any real
retributive function. In criminal law, retributive punishment “appeals
to notions of moral culpability or just deserts” by imposing criminal
sanctions “because it is morally proper to punish that person.” 77 A
number of commentators push the retributive function aside in the
context of entity criminal liability, arguing that the overriding
deterrent purpose overshadows the need to consider retribution as a
justification. 78 But retribution certainly has a place. The lack of any
retributive underpinning in the current standards of liability fails to
reflect the criminal law’s expressive function, which provides that
laws should “express the community’s condemnation of the
wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards for appropriate
behavior . . . .” 79 As demonstrated in the discussion above, principles
of respondeat superior fail to inquire into the true culpability of
organizations and, consequently, whether the organization itself did
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962).
77 Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1979) [hereinafter Developments]. The
retributive justification is traced to Immanuel Kant’s theory that criminal punishment must be
invoked exclusively because the individual has violated the law, regardless of the deterrent
consequences that may flow from the punishment. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (developing this theory).
78 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 77, at 1235–37 (discussing the arguments against
the inclusion of retribution as a consideration in entity criminal liability).
79 Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 843 (2000); see also Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526 (2006) (stating that the respondeat superior doctrine should more
fully exploit criminal law’s expressive capital by selecting cases based on entity
blameworthiness).
75
76

1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM

2012]

THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MENS REA

283

something wrong and deserving of punishment. 80 The appropriate
limits on our criminal law invoked by retributive principles should
not be disregarded in light of the predominant deterrent justification. 81
Although “[r]etribution has not been a traditional aim of corporate
criminal law, . . . once the sense in which corporations are culpable
has been more clearly identified, there is no reason why it should not
become one.” 82
5. The Current Scheme’s Failure to Promote Consistent Enforcement
of the Law
Bucy points to another damaging function of the failure to assess
genuine organizational culpability: its shortcomings in promoting
consistent enforcement of the law.83 The effective strict-liability
standards offer little guidance to prosecutors in determining which
corporations to prosecute. The lack of prosecutorial resources requires
the prosecutor to pick and choose which corporations to prosecute, at
least in theory, based upon an assessment of the organization’s
genuine culpability. 84 For example, the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations cautions prosecutors about
using strict vicarious liability, suggesting prosecutors instead examine
the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing in the firm, because “it may not
be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one
with a robust compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat
superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee.” 85

80 See Buell, supra note 79, at 526 (“[R]espondeat superior is grossly overbroad since it
has almost nothing to do with the social practice of institutional blame.”).
81 See Developments, supra note 77, at 1241 (“[W]hile the primary aim of corporate
criminal sanctions is deterrence, there may be some retributive limitations on the pursuit of this
goal . . . .”).
82 Moore, supra note 39, at 756; see also Developments, supra note 77, at 1231–42 (1979)
(arguing that statues already indicate a preference for some retributive element in corporate
crimes). One commentator, while recognizing that the current federal approach of strict
vicarious liability imposes criminal liability where there is no corporate blameworthiness, notes
that this failure to adequately consider moral blameworthiness “is endemic to the definition of
crimes and defenses.” Beale, supra note 20, at 1488–89 (citing the flaws in assessing culpability
through the restriction or elimination of intent in the insanity defense, in accomplice liability,
and in many weapons and immigration offenses). But the fact that this problem is present in
other areas of the criminal law does not justify the continued use of a flawed system, nor does it
negate the desirability of reform. As the time-honored proverb goes, two wrongs do not make a
right.
83 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1108 (“Requiring proof of intent before imposing criminal
liability also serves a second function: it enhances consistent enforcement of the law.”).
84 See id. at 1108–09. (“Because resources are not available to prosecute every offending
corporation that meets [the broad respondeat superior standards of liability], prosecutors must
pick and choose which corporations to prosecute.”).
85 PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.500.
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While this looks great on paper, it would be naïve to think that all
prosecutors decide when to act by assessing the true fairness of
prosecuting a corporation in light of its independent culpability. 86
Among other improper reasons, the decision may instead be based on
the ease with which a prosecutor may locate a culpable agent and
obtain a conviction. Thus, the prosecutorial guidelines clearly “fail as
an adequate substitute” 87 for consideration of genuine organizational
culpability in the substantive law. Giving the prosecution the nearly
unfettered discretion to exercise their personal, variable views over
whether to indict a corporation, without any required adherence to
legal standards analyzing genuine corporate culpability, opens the
door to arbitrariness.
The current liability model essentially grants the prosecutor power
to act as prosecutor, judge, and jury, which is inherently unfair to
corporate defendants. 88 One commentator effectively analogized this
to shooting fish in a barrel:
The simplicity of using vicarious liability to obtain a
conviction bespeaks a certain unfairness; shooting fish in a
barrel does not seem fair to the fish—nor to a business entity.
. . . Unfairness to the fish results because, under the vicarious
liability standard, accused firms cannot defend themselves on
the basis of either conduct or culpability. 89
Prosecutors use this power to “negotiate deferred prosecution and
nonprosecution agreements, essentially private settlements that
impose large fines and burdensome supervision on corporations.” 90
Paving the way for abuse, prosecutors undertake these negotiations
without the restraints of judicial oversight or grand jury indictments

86

LAUFER, supra note 4, at 24–25:

Although most prosecutors consider the diligent efforts of corporations in deciding
whether to investigate, charge, and pursue an aggressive prosecution, those who do
not raise reasonable concerns. . . . For some state and federal prosecutors, no
evidence of diligence on the part of a company can shield the principal from the acts
of the wayward agent. Here liability is absolute; the miscreant agent simply acts and
speaks for the principal in the commission of a crime.
Id. at 63.
See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 59 (arguing that corporate defendants are
“increasingly relegated to making their most significant moral and factual arguments to
prosecutors, as a matter of ‘policy’ or ‘prosecutorial discretion,’ rather than making them to
judges, as a matter of law, or to juries, as a matter of factual guilt or innocence”).
89 Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private
Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2009).
90 Id.
87
88
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and trials. 91 And the agreements are reached “with no guarantee that
the axe will drop if the prosecutor believes the corporation is not
living up to the agreement.” 92 This lack of prosecutorial discretion
can lead to problems of overinclusiveness, as discussed in the next
section.
6. Overinclusiveness and Underinclusiveness in the Current Scheme
When facing a criminal investigation, the corporation is stuck in a
vulnerable position: either forfeit privileges, fully cooperate, and
accept responsibility in the hopes of prosecutorial and sentencing
leniency, or take its chances with an aggressive defense by refusing to
trade favors. 93 This vulnerability is underscored by the absence of a
liability standard requiring genuine corporate culpability against
which the organization can buttress a defense. Instead, if a
corporation chooses to roll the dice and defend itself against a
prosecution, it is left to hope that the prosecution will be unable to
prove the culpability of an individual agent. This is particularly
absurd because the agent may have acted contrary to the corporate
policies and instructions, and his or her individual interests may clash
with those of the corporation. As one commentator stresses,
“prosecutorial self-restraint does not provide the inherent or legal
protection against the problem of overinclusiveness that a genuine
theory of corporate culpability would provide.” 94
The bulk of the criticisms to this point can be lumped into the
general proposition that the present standards for establishing
corporate criminal liability are overinclusive. Vicarious liability,
however, is also underinclusive. This is because the vicarious-liability
standard fails to impose liability where it may be due. This
underinclusiveness surfaces in cases where blameworthy activity
persisted but the prosecution is unable to locate an individual agent
with the required mens rea.
This problem is exemplified in a recent Massachusetts case,
Commonwealth v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. 95 In that case,
Id.
Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecutorial Abuse in
the Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 251 (2009).
93 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 37 (“In fact, corporations have little choice but to trade
favors with authorities with the threat of significant sentencing guidelines—prescribed fines.”);
Ball & Bolia, supra note 92, at 246 (noting that the increased emphasis on corporate efforts to
impede investigations in the prosecutorial guidelines has raised concern that corporations
“would no longer be able to do anything other than raise a white flag—voluntarily self-report
evidence and fully cooperate”).
94 Moore, supra note 39, at 761.
95 926 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 2010).
91
92
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the corporate operator of a nursing home was charged with
involuntary manslaughter of a resident at its long-term care facility. A
resident died from injuries sustained when she fell down the front
stairs of the facility while attempting to leave in her wheelchair. Due
to the known risk that the patient would attempt to leave the home, a
physician ordered that she wear a bracelet that activates an alarm and
locks the exterior doors if she approached an exit. However, an
administrative employee misinterpreted the director of nursing’s
instruction to “clean up” all resident treatment sheets and removed
numerous physicians’ orders, including orders to wear the bracelets.
The prosecution presented evidence that the omission from the
treatment sheet was noted by the patient’s regular nurses and reported
to a nursing supervisor. 96 But on the night of the accident, a nurse
from a substitute unit supervised the patient and did not check for the
bracelet due to the omission of the bracelet order from the treatment
report. The prosecution attempted to establish the culpability of the
organization by pointing to the conduct of the various employees
whose actions contributed to the accident, including:
[T]he removal of the [bracelet] order from [the patient’s]
chart; the knowledge of her regular nurses that she was
supposed to wear the [bracelet]; the knowledge of various
employees that [the patient] had a tendency to attempt to
leave the nursing home; the knowledge of the nursing
supervisor that the [bracelet] order had been removed from
the chart together with her failure to have the treatment order
re-entered; and the failure of the substitute nurse to check that
[the patient] was wearing her [bracelet]. 97
However, the court adhered to the traditional respondeat superior
theory requiring the prosecution to establish the requisite mental state
in at least one individual agent, and refused to aggregate the various
employees’ acts under the collective knowledge doctrine to attain the
level of culpability required for conviction.98
Although Life Care Centers falls well short of demonstrating the
most egregious misconduct, a set of circumstances with more
aggravating factors can be envisioned—one in which criminal
punishment is warranted on the basis of organizational culpability.
What if the nursing home had a history of similar administrative
Id. at 209–10 n.6.
Id. at 211.
98 Id. at 211; see infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the collective knowledge doctrine
employed by some courts to aggregate the mental states of multiple employees to reach the
required mens rea.
96
97
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errors, compromising the safety of the patients, but failed to
implement adequate procedural requirements to control the errors?
What if the individual to whom the chart reorganization was
delegated had never performed that task and received inadequate
instruction on doing so? What if higher-level nurse management
throughout the corporation had tolerated lax charting and patient-need
communication by the nurses? What if the board of directors ordered
management to cut costs, which led to short staffing, a lack of
preparation by and communication between nurses, and ultimately, to
the patient’s death? These factors would clearly aggravate the
organization’s culpability in the death, but would likely continue to
leave the prosecution unable to single out an agent with the requisite
mental state.
The process through which corporate decisions are made and
actions are taken within the complex organizational structure creates
this dilemma in many circumstances. Marshall Clinard and Peter
Yeager summarize this phenomenon as a product of the fact that
“[o]rganizational machinery in a corporation may be set in motion,
and each subgroup contributes a small impetus perhaps without any
awareness of the illegal and potentially dangerous final result.” 99 This
problem transcends various organizational processes and industries.100
The recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill presents a timely example
of this inherent blame diffusion. During the Department of Justice
investigation, former BP CEO Tony Hayward stated that the Gulf
disaster “was the result of multiple equipment errors and human error
involving many companies.” 101 Although this is an instance of
CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 45.
and Yeager discuss the problem in the case of a drug company: “A drug
corporation . . . has doubts about the safety of a new drug but does not pass on these doubts to
the salesman. The salesman, in turn, assures a doctor that the drug is quite safe; the doctor
prescribes the drug; and the patient dies . . . .” Id. at 45–46. Christopher Stone describes the
issue in the context of an explosion at a nuclear power plant:
99

100 Clinard

We can readily imagine that there might be knowledge of physics, evidence of
radiation leakage, information regarding temperature variations, data related to
previous operation runs in this and other plants, which, if gathered in the mind of one
single person, would make his continued operation of that plant, without a shutdown,
wanton and reckless . . . . But let us suppose what is more likely to be the case in
modern corporate America: . . . [t]he nuclear engineer can be charged with a bit of
information, a, the architect knows b, the night watchman knows c, the research
scientist task force knows d. Conceivably there will not be any single individual who
has, in and of himself, such knowledge and intent as will support a charge against
him individually.
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR 52 (Waveland Press, Inc., 1991) (emphasis in original).
101 BP Report Spreads Blame Across Gulf Spill Actors, CNN U.S. (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:57
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/09/08/us.gulf.oil.disaster/index.html?hpt=T1.

1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM

288

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

shifting blame outside the organization, it is also an example of the
potential difficulties of locating an individually culpable actor within
a corporation. The natural vertical and horizontal integration of
smaller firms by large corporations does not modify the probability or
severity of the misconduct, but the legal standard for holding
corporations criminally liable fails to effectively account for the
contours of organizational action.
Armed with knowledge of this flaw, the corporate defense bar may
exploit this gap in the law during trial to prevent a finding of liability
despite overwhelming evidence of organizational misconduct. In
Arthur Andersen’s obstruction of justice trial resulting from its
document destruction in the wake of its accounting fraud in the Enron
scandal, the defense focused the jury’s attention on a careful
examination of individual employees’ subjective intentions to
“corruptly persuade[].”102 Referring to the government’s failure to
actually name those people before trial, the defense cleverly
compared the prosecutor’s case to the children’s book, Where’s
Waldo?, in which readers work to spot Waldo amongst massive
crowds of similarly-drawn figures. 103 Leveraging that theme, defense
attorney Rusty Hardin frequently began his cross-examinations of
government witnesses by asking, “Are you Waldo?” 104 This comical
tactic actually proved meaningful: during deliberations the jurors
asked the court an unprecedented question: “If each of us believes
that one Andersen agent acted knowingly and with corrupt intent, is it
[necessary] for all of us to believe it was the same agent? Can one
believe it was Agent A, another believe it was Agent B, and another
believe it was Agent C?” 105 As the defense hoped, the jury observed
misconduct on behalf of a number of agents, but struggled to pin
102 REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: HOW TWO WALL STREET JOURNAL
REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA 357
(2003). Andersen was indicted pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code, which provides:

(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to . . .
(2) cause or induce any person to . . .
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to
impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an
official proceeding . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); Indictment at 7–8, United States v.
Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121 (S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318.
103 SMITH & EMSHWILLER, supra note 102, at 357.
104 Id.
105 Jonathan Weil et al., Dramatic Question from Jury Could Shape Andersen’s Fate,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at A1.
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down the culpability of one agent as is generally required under the
present liability standards. Although Andersen was ultimately
convicted at trial, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court,
which held that the jury instructions were misleading because they
did not adequately convey the proper intent requirement of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b). 106 The ultimate disposition of this case aside, the
substantive law simply should not permit the dilemma faced by the
jurors in this case in light of the alternatives for assessing genuine
organizational culpability.
Despite the well-documented shortcomings of vicarious liability in
the corporate criminal law, the present scheme remains rooted in the
flawed rationale of the century-old precedent of New York Central.
That rationale was not only flawed when written, but has been further
undercut over the years with the emerging understanding of true
organizational behavior and misconduct. The maintenance of these
inadequate standards is no longer justified by the argument that there
simply is no better formula for criminally punishing organizations.107
In fact, a number of theories of liability have emerged that
incorporate genuine organizational culpability and avoid many of the
pitfalls of vicarious liability. With further refinement, these theories
may be worked into a practical, consistent conceptualization of
corporate criminal liability more effectively and more fairly serving
the underlying purposes of corporate criminal liability. Thus, the
survival of vicarious liability standards is simply not borne by
necessity, 108 but by inertia.
II.

MOLDING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD INTO GENUINE
CULPABILITY

A. Organizational Theory and Genuine Corporate Culpability
The legal treatment of corporations has shifted from a flat refusal
to recognize the corporation as anything but a legal fiction—
incapable of any action or intention other than that directly derived
from individual agents—to a view of the corporation as a legal
person—an entity existing independently of its individual

106 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (“[T]he jury
instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.”).
107 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 654
(1994) (“Absent a competing conceptualization of corporate liability and culpability, the only
way in which to satisfy the requirements of the criminal law is to focus almost exclusively on a
determination of the agent’s culpability.”).
108 See id. (“Vicarious liability has survived as a matter of necessity . . . .”).
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members. 109 The recognition of corporate personhood has shaped a
number of generally accepted corporate characteristics and
capabilities:
[A corporation] acquires a common will and has a continual
life. It is more than merely the sum of its members. The
independence of the entity from its members render[s] the
exact membership of the entity immaterial: allow[s] for
ownership of property and the assumption of debts; limited
liability for owners; and permit[s] the delegation of
responsibilities down the corporate ladder. 110
And, as needed by the tremendous growth of corporate
prominence during the nineteenth century, the law acknowledged
corporate personhood and brought the corporation within the sphere
of regulatory and criminal law. 111
However, the effort to fit the corporation into the law through the
fictional person approach was eventually criticized for its inherent
flaw: it was an attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole. The law
abruptly squeezed corporations into the existing criminal law without
adequate consideration of the distinctions between organizational and
individual behavior. The fictional person theory was “a failed attempt
by the law to deal with corporate facts without departing from
individualistic premises. Corporations were deemed merely ‘fictional’
entities because the law’s individualistic premises would allow only
isolated natural persons to be viewed as real legal entities.”112 But the
flaws inherent in the fictional person theory of the corporation live on
in the limited recognition of corporate personhood in the criminal
law. In the eyes of the substantive law, a corporation is a “person”
only to the extent necessary to work it into a criminal statute and
attribute to it the blame of an individual agent. This unjustifiably rigid
view of personhood fails to incorporate the dynamics of true
organizational action and culpability.

109 Sanford A Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61
TUL. L. REV. 563, 568 (1987) (“The person theory . . . conceived of the corporation as a real
entity that existed independently of its members.”).
110 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 50.
111 Id. at 47 (arguing that the in order “[t]o indict, prosecute, and convict . . . corporations
and partnerships” that the law “grant[s] [them] the status of a legal person separate and apart
from their many employees and employers scattered in regional headquarters and field offices
around the world”).
112 Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real
Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 583 (1989).
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Simply stated, “the rhetoric of corporate personhood has been far
less profound than convenient.” 113 The constraints imposed by the
continued adherence to principles of individual culpability have
confined the substantive corporate criminal law to a scheme that is
unfair, at times ineffective, and inconsistent with widely-accepted
standards of organizational behavior:
Legislators and courts that seem to struggle with extending
the idea of personhood to matters of liability and blame
nevertheless watch as it is incorporated without reflection in
both prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines. This dichotomy
makes the substantive criminal law look both strange and
weak: strange because prosecutors and judges sidestep the
substantive law, still grounded in principles of vicarious
liability, in favor of ad hoc standards of corporate citizenship,
corporate due diligence, and good corporate governance—
much of it cast in terms of postoffense behavior; weak
because the substantive law, in the context of sentencing law,
is seemingly unable to conceive of an organization in
organizational terms. 114
Given the flaws of the current scheme, the law’s failure to parlay
the organizational independence embodied in the personhood
metaphor into principles of independent corporate action and
intention is puzzling. 115 This recognition is the first logical step
toward understanding the relationship between individual and
organizational action and intention, and in turn, how this relationship
influences genuine organizational culpability. Corporate behavior
cannot be fully understood within the bounds of an analogy to
individual criminality. In order to develop an effective system for
identifying genuine corporate conduct and culpability, it is necessary
to “drop the analogy of the corporation as a person and analyze the
behavior of the corporation in terms of what it really is: a complex
organization.” 116
The present liability standards fail to consider the range of
variables critical to understanding the manner in which an
organization acts, behaves, and exhibits culpability for criminal
113 LAUFER,

supra note 4, at 48.

114 Id.
115 Laufer notes that “[t]here is a wide range of reactions to the ascription of human
characteristics to corporate entities, from a vocal minority who attribute the evils of
globalization to corporate personhood to a majority who do not know what to make of it; reject
it as anthropomorphic, irrelevant; think it inefficient; or are simply ambivalent.” Id. at 47.
116 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 43.
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activity independent of its agents. Organizational theory provides
insight into how the structure and operation of a complex
organization may be translated into illegal corporate behavior. 117
Factors such as the size of the organization, the diffusion of
responsibility, the hierarchical structure, and corporate goals and
policies may shed light on how a climate conducive to criminal
misconduct, or one which even encourages illegal behavior by
corporate agents, may be produced. 118 After rejecting the currentlyinadequate understanding of corporate personhood in the law, the
next necessary step toward the development of superior standards of
corporate criminal liability demands an understanding of the factors
that contribute to genuine organizational culpability.
Bucy’s discussion of a “corporate ethos” as a proxy for assigning
fault soundly exemplifies the distinct natures of individual and
organizational action and intention. 119 Bucy’s ethos theory assumes
that each corporation has a distinctive “‘characteristic spirit’
[reflected by] . . . [s]uperficial things such as the manner of dress and
the camaraderie of the employees as well as formal, written goals and
policies.” 120 Emphasizing corporate independence, Bucy argues that
that this “‘characteristic spirit’ . . . may transcend individuals and
even generations.” 121 Supporting this view, Christopher Stone
observes that “[i]n [the corporate] setting each man’s own wants,
ideas—even his perceptions and emotions—are swayed and directed
by an institutional structure so pervasive that it might be construed as
having a set of goals and constraints (if not mind and purpose) of its
own.” 122 The distinctive cultures reflected from organization to
organization have been readily observed by organizational
theorists. 123 In addition to establishing the organization’s reputation
117 See id. (“[O]rganizational theory can provide some insights into how the corporations’
unique nature as large-scale organizations relates to their illegal behavior.”).
118 Id.; see also Moore, supra note 39, at 753:

Although corporations always act through individual agents, and it is always an
individual agent or group of agents who breaks the law, it is fair to say that
corporations frequently cause their agents to violate the law. The behavior of
individuals in corporations is not merely the product of individual choice; it is
stimulated and shaped by goals, rules, policies, and procedures that are features of
the corporation as an entity.
119 Bucy,
120 Id.

supra note 36, at 1121.
at 1123.

121 Id.
122 STONE,

supra note 100, at 7 (emphasis in original).
WALLY OLINS, THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF
CORPORATE IDENTITY 82 (1978) (“It is not true that all big companies are the same—they
aren’t. . . . [O]rganisations manage to develop an ethos, . . . a personality which is so ingrained,
so much a part of them, that the corporate identity expresses itself in their every action.”); Bucy,
123 See
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and an understanding of its values and operational policies, the
culture bears on the tendencies of corporate agents to engage in
unethical or illegal conduct. For example, Clinard and Yeager found
in an examination of the largest U.S. manufacturing firms that some
firms were charged with a number of violations for illegal political
contributions or foreign payments, indicating a culture conducive to
or encouraging unethical behavior.124
Scholars have recognized a number of characteristics that can
support criminal behavior by corporate agents and, as a result,
demonstrate a connection between agent misconduct and corporate
culpability sufficient to impose criminal blame on the corporation.
Admittedly, it is intimidating, at first glance, to weigh the expanse of
organizational characteristics that may contribute to corporate action
and intention in order to make a culpability determination. These
characteristics, however, may be manageably distilled and organized
into aggravating and mitigating factors and analyzed as pieces of
circumstantial evidence to reach an estimation of organizational
culpability.
Bucy’s summary of evidence contributing to a “corporate ethos”
that encourages misconduct sketches many of the key factors that
contribute to organizational culpability. First is the corporate
hierarchy, which involves an examination of the roles of the board of
directors and high management, and how the individuals filling these
positions, coupled with the structure of authority, contribute to the
control of misconduct, or on the other hand, how they encourage
misconduct. 125 Next, Bucy recommends examination of corporate
goals to determine “whether the goals set by the corporation . . .
promote lawful behavior or are so unrealistic that they encourage
illegal behavior.” 126 This inquiry targets latent culpable corporate
action resulting from an organization’s setting virtually unattainable
goals and turning a blind eye to the means by which the goals are
met. 127 Next, she suggests an inquiry into the corporation’s
compliance efforts. A corporation’s efforts to educate employees
about the legal requirements that correspond to their responsibilities

supra note 36, at 1123–26 (summarizing organizational research focusing on the variation
between organizational cultures).
124 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 58 (finding that “some corporations have been
charged with numerous violations of various types”).
125 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1129–33 (discussing the relationship between corporate
hierarchy and criminal conduct).
126 Id. at 1133.
127 See id. (noting that economic pressures within a corporation may tempt employees to
engage in risky behavior for personal gain).
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play into the ethos inquiry, specifically employees in autonomous
positions because those positions provide ample opportunity for
deviance.128 Similarly, the corporation’s efforts to monitor and
enforce employee compliance with the law are relevant to determine
the corporation’s prevention of, or indifference to, criminal conduct
by employees. 129 Bucy also advocates an examination of the
corporation’s efforts to investigate the offense, focusing specifically
on the degree to which higher echelon officials contributed to or
“recklessly tolerated” the misconduct. 130 Finally, Bucy argues that
courts should examine the degree to which the compensation scheme
and indemnification policies award or condone unlawful behavior.131
This understanding of independent organizational personality
clearly lays the groundwork for the incorporation of genuine
organizational culpability into more substantively sound criminal
liability standards. But with the federal law and all states following
some variation of the two traditional liability standards, the law is still
in need of a stronger model. While most of the work toward a better
standard has, to this point, come from scholars, both law and
academia have awkwardly struggled to develop both a substantively
and practically adequate model making use of genuine organizational
culpability.
B. The Law’s Attempts to Incorporate Genuine Culpability
1. The Collective Knowledge Doctrine
Although the present organizational liability standards continue to
adhere to some variation of the respondeat superior or MPC
approaches, the law has made efforts to recognize independent
organizational personality and culpability. One instance appears in the
judicial doctrine of collective knowledge. This doctrine serves as a
patch for the underinclusiveness produced by the current standards in
circumstances where no individually culpable agent is located but the
organization appears justly to blame for the offense.132 To do so, “[i]t
permits a finding of corporate mens rea to be derived from the
collective knowledge of the corporation’s members.” 133
128 Id.

at 1134–35.
at 1136–38.
130 Id. at 1138.
131 Id. at 1139–46.
132 See Moore, supra note 39, at 763 (“[Collective knowledge] enables courts to find
liability in cases in which the corporation seems ‘justly to blame’ for the crime, but no single
individual has the required mens rea.”).
133 Id.
129 Id.
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The seminal case invoking the collective knowledge doctrine is
United States v. Bank of New England.134 In this case, a bank was
charged with and convicted of willfully violating the Currency
Transaction Reporting Act for its failure to report cash deposits in
excess of $10,000, but argued that no single agent exhibited the
required willfulness. 135 A customer made two to four cash deposits in
multiple transactions, each deposit under $10,000, but with each
transaction aggregating to more than $10,000.136 The teller dealing
with the customer engaging in the transaction at issue may have been
unaware of the Act. 137 The teller’s supervisor was aware of the Act
but did not instruct the teller to record the transaction. The bank’s
project coordinator, working in the bank’s main office, knew of the
aggregation requirement, but had no knowledge that the transaction
had occurred. 138 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit upheld an instruction to the jury permitting it to aggregate
these pieces of knowledge to reach the required willfulness, reasoning
that:
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in
the context of corporate criminal liability. . . . Corporations
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of
specific duties and operations into smaller components. The
aggregate of these components constitutes the corporation's
knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether
employees administering one component of an operation
know the specific activities of employees administering
another aspect of the operation . . . . 139
The court’s justification articulates the progressive recognition of
the collective knowledge doctrine: that corporate intentionality may
exist independent of that of the corporation’s individual agents. 140 But
collective knowledge is simply an inadequate patch over a gaping
hole in the respondeat superior standard. One commentator correctly
observes that it is “a mechanical concept of mental state that fails to
134 821

F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
at 846–47; see also Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§
5311–5322 (2006) (providing reporting requirements and penalties for failure to comply for
financial institutions involved in monetary transactions).
136 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 848.
137 Id. at 857.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 856.
140 On this point, Jennifer Moore recognizes that the doctrine “only makes sense if
employees are viewed as aspects of a corporate entity which is distinct from each of them, and
the crime is understood not as the act of an individual, but as the act of the corporate entity
. . . .” Moore, supra note 39, at 764.
135 Id.
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reflect true corporate fault . . . .”141 Instead, it is a misguided
extension of respondeat superior that merely pieces together remnants
of individual knowledge reflecting individual culpability. 142 Although
unarguably a factor contributing to organizational culpability in some
circumstances, individual culpability is simply not analogous with
corporate culpability. For example, the aggregated culpability of four
rogue, low-level agents may totally contradict that of a wellintentioned organization. Thus, while collective knowledge is a
conceptual step in the right direction, it is far from an adequate
standard of genuine corporate culpability.
2. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983
Another instance of independent organizational fault is found in
the tort doctrine of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
creates a cause of action for deprivation of civil rights under color of
state law. 143 Overturning a previous holding that municipalities were
immune from section 1983 liability, the Supreme Court in Monell v.
Department of Social Services 144 rejected respondeat superior theory
and held that a municipality is liable only where a policy or custom of
the municipality was the official policy or the “moving force” behind
the deprivation. 145 The Court explained that municipalities may incur
liability in two ways: (1) where a policy that has been officially
adopted or promulgated by a local governing body triggers an
unconstitutional act; 146 and (2) for “constitutional deprivations visited
pursuant to a governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.” 147 The latter means of incurring liability sheds
light on how courts may interpret informal organizational customs as
reflecting culpable organizational action.
The post-Monell courts found municipal custom in two
circumstances. First, municipalities were held liable for
“unconstitutional acts by policy-making officials, even where such
acts were one-time events, not intended to establish city-wide

141 Brent Fisse, Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1189–90 (1983).
142 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1157 (“The fiction of collective intent, although perhaps
needed, is simply a desperate, but disingenuous, application of the respondeat superior or MPC
standards.”).
143 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
144 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
145 Id. at 694.
146 Id. at 690.
147 Id. at 690–91.
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routines.” 148 This approach is akin to the MPC standard for corporate
criminal liability and adheres to the principle that actions by highlevel decision makers more closely reflect organizational action than
do acts by lower-level agents. 149 However, the Court in Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati 150 narrowed the definition of “policy-making
official” to mean an official who is granted “final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered,”
limiting this line of liability. 151 Additionally, municipalities were
liable for unconstitutional acts resulting from indirect or informal
policies or customs, which surfaced in a series of police brutality
cases where courts held municipalities liable for civil rights violations
“committed by police officers where the municipality had a policy or
custom of failing properly to train, supervise, or discipline members
of the police force.” 152 However, over time “the Court has nearly
eliminated . . . municipal[] liability on the basis of an informal, de
facto policy . . . and has moved progressively toward the view that a
municipal policy cannot exist in the absence of intentional choice by
policy-making officials.” 153
Despite the subsequent limitation of its liability standards, Section
1983 jurisprudence demonstrates the court’s willingness and ability to
differentiate organizational from individual action and culpability.
148 Moore, supra note 39, at 773 (citing Williams v. Butler, 746 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir.
1984) (citing cases in which one-time events were sufficient to constitute an unconstitutional act
on the part of a municipality).
149 Justice Stevens articulated this nexus from an organizational theory perspective in City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik:

Every act of a high official constitutes a kind of ‘statement’ about how similar
decisions will be carried out; the assumption is that the same decision would have
been made, and would again be made, across a class of cases. Lower officials do not
control others in the same way. Since their actions do not dictate the responses of
various subordinates, those actions lack the potential of controlling governmental
decision-making; they are not perceived as the actions of the city itself.
485 U.S. 112, 171 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 469 (1986) (plurality opinion).
151 Id. at 481.
152 Moore, supra note 39, at 774; see also Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1392–95
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city could be liable for police misconduct where it failed to
institute policies to ensure the safety of people in custody, failed to investigate claims of
misconduct and discipline officers who were known to have committed abuse, and establish
quota systems for arrests and citations that encouraged the use of force).
153 Id. at 775; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1989) (explaining
that although the finding of an informal policy is not absolutely precluded where misconduct
results from the lack of an adequate training program, it will be extremely rare); Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483–84 (holding that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only
where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives” by city policy-makers); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24
(1985) (holding that municipal liability can never be based on a single incident, instead
requiring a pattern of conduct).
150 475
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The courts applying the doctrine expressly rejected respondeat
superior theory in favor of a doctrine of organizational fault and
correctly recognize that organizational fault is at least in part located
in the acts of high-echelon agents and in organizational customs and
policies. Scholars use these same basic principles in deriving the
corporate character or corporate ethos liability standards,154
establishing the value of the guidance provided by the municipal
liability doctrine in understanding a standard of genuine corporate
culpability.
3. Federal Prosecutorial and Sentencing Guidelines
Prosecutors and judges, at least on paper, are guided by principles
of true organizational fault at both the pre-indictment and postconviction stages in the federal prosecutorial and United States
Sentencing Guidelines. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations provide prosecutors “guidelines and strategies
that allow for the diversion from the criminal process corporations
undeserving of criminal prosecution”155 in the absence of a legal
standard that sufficiently fills this role. Nonetheless, the prosecutorial
guidelines explicitly renounce strict vicarious liability for purposes of
making the indictment decision156 in favor of a model for limiting
prosecution to circumstances where the acts of the corporation’s
agents are “fairly attributable to it.”157
The Principles provide a list of factors to guide prosecutors in
making the charging decision:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense . . . ;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the
wrongdoing by corporate management . . . ;
3. The corporation’s history of similar misconduct . . . ;
4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents . . . ;
154 See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the corporate ethos or corporate character
standards of organizational criminal liability.
155 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 61.
156 See P RINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.500 (“[I]t may not be appropriate to impose
liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance program in place, under a
strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee.”).
157 Id.
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5. The existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s preexisting compliance program . . . ;
6. The corporation’s remedial actions . . . ;
7. Collateral consequences . . . to shareholders . . . ;
8 the adequacy of the prosecution of the individuals
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and
9. The adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions . . . . 158
These guidelines clearly recognize principles of organizational
behavior, corporate personhood, and independent culpability. For
example, the Principles acknowledge that a corporation is more
culpable where the misconduct was pervasive, rather than isolated,
such as where it is “undertaken by a large number of employees” or
“condoned by upper management.” 159 Additionally, in considering the
corporation’s history, prosecutors are directed that “[a] corporation,
like a natural person, is expected to learn from its mistakes. A history
of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate culture that
encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless of any
compliance programs.” 160 Further, the Principles acknowledge the
mitigating effect on organizational culpability resulting from a
properly enforced compliance program 161 and the possible sufficiency
of prosecution of the individual wrongdoers in place of the
corporation. 162
“Even a casual reading of [the Principles] leads to the conclusion
that prosecutors used their vast discretion to craft a new set of liability
rules, without legislative assistance, that largely abandon principles of
vicarious liability and attempt to replace the substantive law with
permissive guidance recognizing corporate personhood.” 163 But this
attempt fails as an adequate solution—the guidelines are merely, as
they purport to be, guidelines. The Principles recognize that “[i]n
making a decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor generally
has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even
whether to prosecute . . . .” 164 Prosecutorial discretion remains unduly
158 Id.

§ 9–28.300 (citations omitted).
§ 9–28.500.
160 Id. § 9–28.600 cmt.
161 Id. § 9–28.800.
162 Id. § 9–28.300.
163 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 63.
164 PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 9–28.300 cmt.
159 Id.
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broad, 165 and these guidelines provide neither the predictable
guidance nor the protection to the accused of a binding liability
standard.
Post-trial, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
employ a culpability grading scheme utilizing aggravating and
mitigating factors indicative of genuine organizational culpability to
determine the fine upon conviction.166 Aggravating factors include:
(1) involvement in or tolerance of the offense by high-level personnel
or pervasive tolerance by substantial authority personnel; (2) prior
criminal history; (3) violation of a judicial order or injunction; and (4)
obstruction of justice. 167 The mitigating factors include: (1)
organizational self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of
responsibility and (2) the presence of an effective compliance and
ethics program. 168 Again, the consideration of these factors, indicative
of genuine organizational culpability, is a step in the right direction,
but this consideration is not mandatory 169 and simply takes place too
late in the game, when criminal liability has already been imposed
without a guaranteed analysis of organizational culpability. 170
The prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines demonstrate the
system’s willingness and ability to consider genuine organizational
intention and culpability, but do not provide adequate substitutes for a
liability standard doing the same. The disconnect between the
guidelines and liability standards is unjustified and “remains a critical
problem of law reform . . . .” 171 The system remains in need of
liability standards considering genuine organizational culpability.
C. Proposed Models of Genuine Corporate Culpability
In response to the well-documented flaws of vicarious liability
standards for imposing criminal liability on organizations, a number
of theories have emerged that incorporate genuine corporate fault into
165 See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with
prosecutorial discretion in corporate crime.
166 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2010).
167 Id. §§ (b)–(e).
168 Id. §§ (f)–(g).
169 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005) (holding that treating the
federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory violated the Sixth Amendment).
170 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1160 (“Under current standards of corporate liability, by the
time the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines impact on a corporation, the factfinders have
already convicted the corporation without adequate evidence of corporate intent.”); see also
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally
Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1276 (2000) (observing that the organizational sentencing
guidelines blur the line between the liability and sentencing stages as they incorporate “many of
the factors and issues that we more commonly associate with the liability stage”).
171 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 65.
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the liability standards. One theory, proactive corporate fault, imposes
liability where a corporation fails to make reasonable efforts to
implement internal controls to prevent the commission of a crime. 172
Evidence of reasonable efforts to prevent organizational crime is
gleaned from “(1) the development and implementation of safeguards
to prevent crime commission and (2) the delivery of clear and
convincing prohibitions of criminal behavior in the form of business
conduct codes, ethics codes, and compliance training programs.” 173
This theory is a variation of the due diligence defense available under
the MPC. 174 The principal argument for this defense is deterrencebased—it provides a proper incentive for the corporation to make
efforts to encourage statutory compliance knowing that it will avoid
criminal liability. 175
Although this standard incorporates the organization’s efforts to
secure compliance, which is a key component of genuine
organizational culpability, this component is merely one of many
factors that contribute to organizational culpability. The treatment of
due diligence as an end-all to the culpability analysis would
compromise an arguably appropriate conviction where a number of
aggravating culpability factors are present but the organization shows
that it implemented an otherwise strong compliance program. The
defense also opens the door for organizations to point to ostensibly
air-tight compliance programs that, in substance, are mere shams to
shield the organization from a conviction.176
On the opposite end of the spectrum lies reactive corporate fault
theory, which focuses on the organization’s reaction to the
misconduct. 177 Under this theory, the basis of the organization’s
liability is the reasonableness of the organization’s reaction after it
172 Id.

at 57.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations incorporate a detailed
definition of an effective compliance and ethics program for use in ascertaining the
organization’s culpability score at the sentencing stage which could be used to guide the inquiry
analysis at the liability stage. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010)
(stating the elements of an effective compliance and ethics program).
174 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1962) (“[I]t shall be a defense if the defendant
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its
commission.”).
175 See James R. Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY.
L.J. 73, 119 (1976) (“[T]he purpose for imposing liability is to encourage the corporation’s
efforts to secure statutory compliance by its employees. That purpose is not served . . . where
the corporation has in fact diligently supervised its employees and they violate the statute
contrary to express instructions.”) (footnote omitted).
176 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of organizational
compliance games used to superficially avoid liability.
177 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 58 (defining reactive corporate fault).
173 Id.
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discovers that one of its agents has committed a crime, and culpability
and liability will be imposed for a “[f]ailure to undertake corrective
measures in reaction to the discovery of an offense . . . .” 178 Although
it was initially suggested that reactive fault theory be reserved “only
for less-serious offenses,” 179 scholars subsequently advocated its use
for all criminal offenses. 180 The obvious flaw of reactive fault theory
is that it “fails to capture a genuine corporate culpability to the extent
that [it] reflects an entity’s response to the discovery of an illegal act
rather than the commission of the act itself.” 181 In other words, the ex
post perspective of reactive fault diverges from the principle that the
criminal act must coincide with a culpable mens rea. 182 And similar to
proactive fault, the narrow analysis of reactive fault falls well short of
a full analysis of the factors contributing to organizational fault
required to make a complete culpability assessment.
Corporate ethos or corporate culture theory addresses the glaring
limitations of proactive and reactive fault theories by attributing
fault to an organizational culture or personality that encourages
criminal conduct by agents of the corporation.183 Evidence of such an
ethos or culture may be demonstrated by a number of factors,
including the corporate hierarchy, corporate goals and policies, efforts
to ensure compliance with ethics codes and legal regulations, the
indemnification of employees, the oversight role of the board of
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See id. at 58 (citing Brent Fisse, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 15 CRIM. L.J. 166,
173–74 (1991) (suggesting that Australia adopt a standard of corporate criminal liability under
which a corporation is liable where (1) the offense was committed by an agent; and (2) the
corporation was at fault in at least one way, including, among other means based on proactive
fault and corporate policy “by having a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take
preventative measures in response to having committed the external elements of the offence; or .
. . by failing to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to comply with a
reactive duty to take preventative measures in response to having committed the external
elements of the offence.”)).
181 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 60.
182 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (quoting People v. Flack, 26
N.E. 267, 270 (N.Y. 1891) (“[T]o constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a
criminal intention. Under our system . . . both must be found by the jury to justify a conviction
for crime.”).
183 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1121 (discussing the definition of the corporate ethos
standard); see also the Australian Criminal Code, which allows corporate criminal liability
based on a “corporate culture . . . within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated
or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision,” or the lack of “a corporate culture that
required compliance. . . .” Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.5 s 12.3(2)(c)–(d), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/EA8F2A398EBE535C
CA2570B20015CC28/$file/CriminalCode1995_WD02.pdf. The Australian Criminal Code
defines “corporate culture” as “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing
within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant
activities takes [sic] place.” Id. at s 12.3(6).

1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM

2012]

THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT MENS REA

303

directors and how the corporation has reacted to past violations.184 As
Bucy argues, a corporate ethos standard would clean up much of the
over- and underinclusiveness of the respondeat superior standards by
utilizing this range of organizational culpability factors to guide the
inquiry. 185 Testing this hypothesis, Bucy applies the model to five
recurring circumstances in which corporate criminal matters arise:
(1) cases where the corporation is closely held; (2) cases
where higher echelon corporate agents commit the criminal
act; (3) cases where lower echelon corporate agents commit
the criminal act; (4) cases where corporate agents commit the
criminal act in contravention of corporate policy or express
instructions; and (5) cases where the court cannot identify the
corporate agent who commits the criminal act.186
Bucy generally hypothesizes that liability is probable in the first two
circumstances primarily due to the close nexus between individual
and organizational action. 187 The corporate ethos standard generally
avoids the counterintuitive imposition of liability in the fourth
circumstance due to the lack of an ethos encouraging the rogue
agent’s deviance. 188 Liability in cases where a low-ranked agent
commits the act and where the prosecution cannot locate a
responsible agent hinges on a far less simplistic weighing of the
universe of factors indicative of the organization’s culpability to
determine whether they add up to an ethos that encouraged the
misconduct. 189 Using fact patterns falling under these two
circumstances, Bucy weighs the organizational factors probative of an
encouraging ethos, draws the liability line, and summarizes that

184 See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text (summarizing the factors contributing
to a corporate ethos); see also Bucy, supra note 36, at 1129–47 (detailing the required inquiry
into a corporate ethos that encourages criminal conduct).
185 See Bucy, supra note 36, at 1150 (“The corporate ethos standard . . . . does not . . .
simply transfer [the intent of individual agents] to an entity; rather, the corporate ethos standard
looks beyond the corporate agent’s intent to all aspects of the corporation that could have
encouraged the criminal act. This corporate ethos analysis will result in both more, and less,
convictions than the current standards . . . .”).
186 Id.
187 See id. at 1151 (arguing that the corporate ethos standard will almost certainly yield a
conviction where the corporation is closely held because “[w]hen the corporation is
synonymous with one or a few individuals, its ethos is also synonymous with the criminal intent
of those individuals”); id. at 1152(“[C]ourts are also likely to convict corporations whose higher
echelon corporate agents commit the criminal conduct.”).
188 Id. at 1154 (“[U]nder the corporate ethos test, liability almost certainly would not attach
to the corporation in this category of cases.”).
189 See id. at 1152–54 (applying the standard to cases where lower-echelon agents
committed the misconduct); id. at 1156–57 (applying the standard to cases where a responsible
agent cannot be located).
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liability will result upon a finding of “corporate actions that make
corporate liability appropriate.” 190
But just when is liability appropriate? Although the imposition of
liability under the corporate ethos test more closely reflects true
organizational culpability, the ambiguity of the result under this last
circumstance demonstrates some clear shortcomings. Specifically, it
fails to provide sufficiently concrete and predictable guidance as to
how the variables contributing to an ethos are weighed in making the
liability determination. More importantly, it fails to clarify the
appropriate threshold beyond which it may be said that those
variables actually encourage specific criminal violations requiring
various mens rea for conviction, and how this threshold correlates
with the mens rea in the statute at issue. It is merely a smell test.
Consider the following questions: What evidence would prove a
corporate ethos that encouraged a negligent crime? How does that
requirement contrast with the ethos required to encourage willful or
purposeful crime? How does the analysis resolve the liability of an
organization showing characteristics reflecting both an ethos
discouraging and encouraging the conduct at issue? When merely
presented the body of variables that may contribute to a corporate
ethos encouraging misconduct, absent more finite elements and
clearer principles of application, the answers to these questions lack
the predictability required of a sufficient liability standard.
A fundamental flaw of the corporate-ethos standard, as with
proactive and reactive fault, is it was “drafted with little concern for
the basic requirements of criminal law.”191 These standards “all but
abandon the requirement for finding a mens rea, or a mental state
associated with corporate acts.” 192 In litigating crimes committed by
individuals, the prosecution presents direct and circumstantial
evidence with reference to the specific mens rea required for
conviction. The required mens rea provides guidance as to what
evidence is relevant to the grade of culpability required for
conviction. 193 In contrast, these models of genuine organizational
culpability do not require proof of an organizational mental state
corresponding to the mental state required to establish each element
190 Id.

at 1157.
supra note 4, at 59.

191 LAUFER,
192 Id.

193 For example, the prosecution seeking a murder conviction under the Model Penal Code,
generally requiring that the defendant act with purpose or knowledge as to the death, must
present evidence demonstrating the individual’s purpose or knowledge. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1962) (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is committed
purposely or knowingly.”). This evidence could include, for example, testimony and forensic
evidence probative of motive and deliberate action.
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of the offense. In the Arthur Andersen case, for example, the
prosecution bore the burden of proving an agent’s knowingly corrupt
persuasion of another to obstruct justice.194 Under the corporate-ethos
standard, the prosecution would apparently have had to disregard the
knowledge requirement written into the statute, and instead present
evidence that an ethos existed at Andersen that generally encouraged
the misconduct. This essentially reduces the mens rea to negligence
for all offenses, 195 setting aside the traditional limiting function of
mental state requirements.196
Although these “[e]fforts to move beyond elementary imputations
of intention and action are a positive step in the development of a
conceptually sound body of law,” 197 they are in need of further
modification. Because they entirely lack synergy with the present
criminal statutes, “these models fail for reasons of
implementation.” 198 Laufer summarizes this shortcoming by
observing that the models of genuine corporate culpability “are
models of organizational liability rather than culpability . . . .” 199 In
other words, they are proposals for entirely new liability standards
which necessarily disregard the liability standards set forth in the
present criminal statutes. They simply “cannot be incorporated
wholesale into the thousands of federal statutory provisions that allow
for corporate criminal liability.” 200
In response to the observed limitations of these models, Laufer
proposes a “constructive model of corporate fault” incorporating the
principles of organizational culpability into a standard that, he argues,
“make[s] use of existing standards . . . of culpability [and which is]
capable of implementation without recodification of the federal
criminal law or significant alteration of state law.”201 To accomplish
this end, “constructive corporate fault” uses objective analysis in
194 See Indictment at 7, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Cr. No. CRH–02–121
(S.D. Tex. March 7, 2002), 2002 WL 33949318 (indicting Arthur Andersen for “knowingly,
intentionally and corruptly” persuading others to withhold, destroy, and alter documents). For
the statutory basis of Andersen’s conviction, see supra note 102.
195 See V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 375 (1999) (casting many of the proposed models of
genuine corporate culpability, including corporate ethos, proactive fault, and reactive fault as
forms of negligence, “impos[ing] liability when the corporation’s internal procedures and
policies are negligent in some way.”).
196 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 59 (“[M]ental state requirements limit the reach of the
criminal law to those individuals and organizations that demonstrate a certain willfulness,
recklessness, intention, purpose, or knowledge in committing a prohibited act.”).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 60.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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addition to the traditional subjective inquiry into the accused’s mental
state. 202 The objective is used in determining the reasonableness of
imputing the agent’s actions to the corporation and whether it is fair
or reasonable to assign a specific level of culpability. 203 Laufer
emphasizes the constructive perspective of the standard, which he
summarizes as “constructive in the sense of construing facts,
circumstances, conduct, and intentionality of the organization,
prompting a fair or reasonable attribution of liability.” 204
Necessitated by the fact that corporate action and intention are
“almost always . . . derivative of individual or group action,”205
Laufer’s theory of constructive fault “permits fact finders to move
beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in order to
find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or
inferred—with or without the assistance of subjective evidence of the
defendant.” 206 This model is a significant step toward a substantively
and practically sound model through its maintenance of the centrality
of mental states in criminal liability standards while recognizing the
distinctions between individual and corporate mental states. Using the
federal prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines as an inspiration, 207
Laufer seeks to place a liability standard more synergistic with the
pre- and post-liability culpability inquiries.208
The first step in the inquiry is to determine whether there was true
corporate action for which to hold the corporation liable. Laufer
suggests that:
[c]ulpable organizational action may be identified through an
objective test where it is determined that given the size,
complexity, formality, functionality, decision-making
process, and structure of the corporate organization, it is
reasonable to conclude that the agents’ acts are those of the
corporation. This reasonableness test is a threshold
202 See id. at 70–86 (describing Laufer’s suggested subjective-objective analysis for
deriving corporate action and corporate intention).
203 Id. at 71 (“Courts should rely on evidence of action and intention that . . . “prompt[s] a
fair or reasonable attribution of liability.”). Laufer packages this standard as “hybrid fault” due
to the synergies of the subjective and objective. Id. at 87–91.
204 Id. at 71.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 72.
207 Id. at 61.
208 See id. at 71 (noting that this theory requires evidence that “reflect[s] the connectedness
between an agent’s acts or intents and that of the organization,” as well as evidence that
“captures an action or intention that is not attributable to any single agent or group but comes
from the organization”); see also id. (arguing that this theory of constructive fault “lay[s] the
groundwork for a substantive corporate criminal law . . . on par with that crafted by the
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations”).
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assessment that separates cases in which corporate acts have
occurred from individual noncorporate acts or secondary
acts. 209
To make this reasonableness assessment, he defers to courts and
juries to “develop a calculus, considering evidence relating to
delegation, authorization, and reckless toleration, as well as the status
of the agent who has acted . . . .” 210 The strength of the agent-entity
relationship, or the degree of organizational “authorship,” is central to
ascertaining corporate action. 211 Laufer recognizes that the strength of
the relationship will preliminarily hinge on the status of the agent in
the corporate hierarchy, but will be “far less mechanical” where the
agent-entity relationship is more remote. 212 In general terms, a finding
of constructive corporate action is more probable where high level
agents are involved in the violation, while less likely when the act
involves lower level personnel whose connections to the corporation
are more tenuous.
Although this step takes care of the rogue agent problem, it risks
completely unpredictable application and premature disposition of the
liability analysis where an under-guided factfinder fails to find
corporate action without assessing the remaining factors contributing
to genuine organizational culpability, which is the integral stage of
the analysis. The suggestion that courts and juries will “develop a
calculus” with which to evaluate the expanse of organizational
variables to determine whether a finding of corporate action is
“reasonable” is oversimplified. This test is extremely malleable, in
that it merely sets the table for unpredictable application because a
jury has no familiar benchmark against which to make the suggested
reasonableness judgment. This clumsiness may unduly compromise a
full assessment of culpability by permitting the factfinder to drop a
large portion of the culpability analysis in cases where it misguidedly
resolves liability at the corporate action inquiry. In this respect,
Laufer’s standard blurs the line between organizational action and
culpability. A more effective inquiry should consider all variables that
contribute to organizational action and intention before making the
ultimate liability determination. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to
consider the agent-entity relationship as a factor indicative of
organizational culpability, not organizational action. If an agent acted
209 Id.

at 72 (emphasis omitted).
at 72–73.
211 See id. at 73 (“The stronger the agent-entity relationship, the more reasonable it is to
consider an agent’s action to be a construction of the corporation’s.”).
212 Id.
210 Id.
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in some capacity connected to the organization, the action should be
treated as organizational action and the analysis should proceed to the
culpability assessment.
Despite the room for improvement in Laufer’s standard for
ascertaining organizational action, his model for assessing culpability
effectively incorporates genuine organizational culpability while
preserving grades of culpability used in the present criminal statutes.
As a framework, he uses the Model Penal Code hierarchy of mental
states—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—and
identifies an array of organizational variables and necessary evidence
that may be used to fit organizational conduct into those grades of
culpability. 213 While the federal law uses hundreds of mental states,
those mental states may effectively be boiled down into the four MPC
classifications commonly used in state criminal law.214
The highest form of MPC culpability is purposive action, which
occurs when it is one’s conscious object, or desire, to engage in an act
or cause a particular result.215 Laufer summarizes purposive corporate
action as existing in circumstances where “the corporation has . . .
engaged in acts with a desire to bring about a certain, foreseeable
result,” and where the offense entails attendant circumstances, where
the corporation “at [a] minimum know[s] or believe[s] that these
requisite circumstances exist.” 216 Corporate purpose will appear as
“(1) policies and practices that explicitly, implicitly, or through
operation promote and encourage illegality, (2) efforts to ratify or
endorse the violation of law, and (3) express or tacit authorization,
approval, consent, or support of the illegality.” 217 However, Laufer
clouds the inquiry by suggesting that “[c]onstructive corporate
culpability considers this evidence by asking whether the average
corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure,
given the circumstances presented, purposely engaged in the illegal
act.” 218 It is unclear just how this added context aids the inquiry. In
fact, this addition makes the analysis more abstract than necessary,
exhibiting another flaw with the standard. This flaw aside, however,
213 See id. at 78–85. For a summary of these mental states and the organizational variables
and evidence indicative of action falling within those variables see id. at 84–85.
214 See id. at 78 (“With over one hundred different mental states . . . in Title 18 alone, it is
not unreasonable to reexamine the integrity of the United States Code . . . [but] it does not defy
classification. The . . . Model Penal Code provide[s] a hierarchy of culpable mental states for
state law that captures many of the mental state distinctions found in the federal criminal law as
well.”).
215 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962).
216 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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Laufer effectively sets forth the key evidence probative of corporate
purpose.
Laufer notes that most corporate crime cases exhibiting purposeful
action will likely involve “small firms existing solely for the purpose
of committing fraud.” 219 While these would be the easiest cases
because of the close nexus between high management and intentional
misconduct, corporate purpose would also likely be present in larger
firms exhibiting evidence of deliberate misconduct amongst high
ranking corporate officers.
Conduct undertaken with knowledge, the next-lowest level of
culpability under the MPC, requires only that the actor is “practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result” if the element
involves a result of the actor’s conduct, and “if the element involves
the nature of [the actor’s] conduct or attendant circumstances,” an
awareness that his conduct is of a certain nature or that certain
circumstances exist. 220 Courts generally have taken the definition
further in interpreting positive knowledge to include willful
ignorance, or deliberate avoidance of knowledge. 221 Constructive
corporate knowledge is determined by asking whether “[g]iven any
evidence of actual awareness, permission, toleration, or willingness
[with respect to the illegality at issue], would an average corporation
of like size and structure have been aware of the nature of its
conduct?” 222 Laufer posits that corporate knowledge will encompass a
significant portion of corporate crime cases, “especially cases where
the most senior of management knows, condones, or tacitly approves
of illegal acts.” 223
Next on the culpability hierarchy is recklessness, which requires
that the actor “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk” of harm which involves “a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” 224 Laufer presents the corporate recklessness inquiry as:
“[c]onsidering the circumstances known, and the nature of the
conduct committed, was the entity’s disregard of risks substantial and

219 Id.

at 79.
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
221 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 80 (noting that “[c]ourts have considered willful
ignorance, or deliberately abstaining from knowledge, as actual or positive knowledge”). See
also, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (“To act ‘knowingly,’
therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an
awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question.”).
222 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 80.
223 Id.
224 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
220 MODEL
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unjustifiable?” 225 Laufer takes an objective position on corporate
recklessness, attributing the mental state where a corporation engages
in “unreasonably risk-laden behavior without actual, positive
knowledge of the illegality,” 226 using as a reference the “risks that an
average, comparable corporation would have known or been aware of
in like circumstances.” 227 Similar to his analysis of constructive
corporate knowledge, Laufer focuses on senior management, finding
recklessness where senior management must have known of its
corporation’s unreasonably risk-laden behavior. 228 The corporaterecklessness standard also catches many of the cases of deliberate
indifference in which executives arrange reporting patterns that
insulate them from positive knowledge of information respecting
potentially criminal conduct. 229
The lowest level of culpability, corporate negligence, is present
“where an entity inadvertently creates a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of which it ought to have been aware.”230 Negligence is an
entirely objective standard under the MPC, providing for the best fit
among the mental states with the objectively-driven constructive fault
model. 231 Laufer observes that corporate negligence catches, for
example, cases where management is unaware, but should have
known of fraud perpetrated by low- or mid-level employees. 232
225 LAUFER,

supra note 4, at 81.

226 Id.
227 Id.
228 For example, Laufer cites the case against Emery Worldwide Airlines, an air cargo
carrier that pled guilty to twelve violations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act in
2003 for the placement by its employees of hazardous materials on its aircraft without properly
notifying its pilots. Id. at 81–82. Laufer implies that a finding of corporate recklessness may be
appropriate even though senior Emery executives lacked positive knowledge of the failures to
notify because there were “credible allegations that management must have been aware of the
problems with hazmat shipments and, at the very least, disregarded positive knowledge.” Id. at
82.
229 See id. (citing recent cases against a number of infamous executives as alleging,
implicitly or explicitly, recklessness against the executives for their failures to “engage in the
kind of diligent actions expected of a person in the position of a chief executive”); STONE, supra
note 100, at 53:

Directors and high-up officers of corporations . . . could not know of everything their
organization was doing even if they tried—and often, preferring not to know, they
arrange patterns of reporting so they cannot find out (or, at least, if they do find out,
they find out only in such a way that it can never be proved).
230 LAUFER,

supra note 4, at 82.
the Model Penal Code, an individual acts negligently where he “should be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to
perceive it . . . involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
232 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 82. Implying corporate negligence, Laufer cites a 2003 case
against AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP in which it settled fraud charges alleging that its
employees gave thousands of free samples of a prostate cancer drug to doctors, knowing that
231 Under
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Constructive corporate fault is the most conceptually sound of the
outstanding academic models for incorporating genuine
organizational culpability into the corporate criminal law. It
represents a significant stride toward an effective marriage of the
understanding of independent organizational action and intention and
the practical and normative necessity of maintaining the graded mens
rea requirements in the existing criminal law. Laufer’s disposal of the
exclusively subjective mens rea is a significant step in moving from
the limits of vicarious liability, and in lessening the burden on
factfinders to distill evidence down to an organizational mental state.
Thus, insofar as the objective element permits the use of reasonable
objective inferences in the analysis, it is undeniably useful.
However, this model requires further refinement to ensure accurate
and predictable application. Although it fits practically into the
existing criminal law, it fails to give due consideration to the judges
and juries who will be charged with its implementation. The general
weakness lies in the standard’s idealistic use of an objective standard,
making the already complex task of determining a corporate mental
state more complex than necessary. This unnecessary complexity
comes from two sources: (1) the reasonableness test required in
determining whether the action at issue was corporate action; and (2)
the mental state inquiries requiring the factfinder to determine the
mens rea of a corporation by asking whether, considering the
circumstances, a similar corporation engaged in the conduct at issue
possessed the required mental state. The former merely adds an
unnecessary inquiry which may be more easily and properly absorbed
into the mental state analysis.233 Similarly, the reasonableness
judgments required in the mental state analysis confuse the inquiry by
asking jurors to consider whether an “average corporation”234 would
possess the required mental state. This benchmark adds unnecessary
and unhelpful perspective to the already complex and abstract concept
of corporate mental states.
This complexity stems from traditional methods of making
assessments of culpability in tort and criminal law, in which the jury
is commonly asked to jump in to the mind of the accused or to make

Medicare and Medicaid would be billed for the samples, and offered other illegal inducements
pursuant to its aggressive marketing plan. Id. at 82–83. The company acknowledged the fraud
but pointed out that it was unknown to senior management, and the prosecution did not single
out individually culpable employees. Id. at 83.
233 For a more in-depth discussion of Laufer’s standard of constructive action, see supra
notes 201–10.
234 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78.
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judgments from the perspective of a reasonable person. 235 This task,
while demanding, is feasible because the jurors are human beings.
Armed with their own experiences, their understandings of human
thought, decision making, and reaction, and their abilities to consider
different perspectives and circumstances, jurors can be reasonably
expected to develop benchmarks against which they may estimate
another individual’s mental state. However, for jurors to step into the
shoes of an “average corporation” to make corporate mental state
determinations is much less straight-forward. For example, it is not
unrealistic to assume that a jury may simply fail to grasp how a
corporation, an intangible entity, can possess knowledge, a
traditionally individualistic concept, creating an understanding barrier
that would trigger improper application. A jury in this situation would
likely be incapable of understanding how the differences in “size,
complexity, formality, functionality, decision making process and
structure” 236 between corporations affect the threshold for a
corporation’s formation of knowledge. 237 Constructive corporate fault
asks too much of the factfinder if it expects any consistency in
application, which compromises its substantive strength. But with
further refinement, Laufer’s conceptualization may be parlayed into a
more user-friendly standard retaining its overall substantive strength.
III. IMPLEMENTING A MORE WORKABLE STANDARD: THE SENIOR
MANAGEMENT MENS REA
A. The Senior Management Perspective
Among the models of genuine corporate culpability, constructive
culpability strikes the best balance between a full consideration of
genuine organizational culpability and the practical and normative
necessity of maintaining the grades of culpability used in the existing
criminal statutes. But while constructive culpability is suitable in
theory, its potential efficacy is compromised for reasons of
implementation. As Bucy recognizes, any new standard of corporate
culpability will naturally present difficulties in administration
compared to the present liability standards. 238 Laufer’s model,
235 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (using the reasonable person benchmark in
the standard for criminal negligence).
236 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (emphasis removed).
237 This incapability is understandable in the abstract task of attributing traditionally human
mental states to an organization with potentially thousands of constituents and various sources
of behavior, culture, policy and culpability.
238 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1180 (countering the likely criticism that courts will find the
corporate ethos standard more difficult to administer, stating that “[i]n part, the difficulty will
stem from unfamiliarity with a new standard of liability . . . [and] from the fact that the
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however, presents unnecessary implementation difficulties by
requiring the factfinder to make culpability judgments using the
perspective of the average corporation, a daunting task for an
organizational theorist, let alone a group of lay jurors. However, it is
possible to use the groundwork of constructive fault to shift
perspective in a way that will add clarity while maintaining due
consideration of genuine organizational culpability and graded mental
states.
Instead of adopting the unduly abstract perspective of a
comparable corporation, this Note proposes a model requiring the
factfinder to adopt the perspective of senior management, as a group,
to determine corporate action and mens rea. This shift provides
increased workability compared to constructive fault, most generally,
by relieving the courts of much of the burden of analyzing evidence
of actual knowledge of corporate agents and other evidence of
genuine culpability and using that evidence to determine mental states
of a complex, abstract, and intangible entity. Specifically, the senior
management mens rea (SMMR) first simplifies Laufer’s suggested
model for deriving corporate action by eliminating the factfinder’s
task of evaluating an organization’s structure to determine whether a
reasonable factfinder may determine that the agents’ acts are those of
the organization. Instead, this model presumes corporate action
through senior management’s encouraged corporate culture; its
development and implementation of organizational goals, strategy,
policy, and procedures; and its general roles of delegation,
management, and oversight. Second, the model guides the factfinder
to consider evidence of culpability, using reasonable, nonsubjective
inferences to determine culpability from a more concrete, familiar
perspective than an “average [comparable] corporation” 239 by instead
looking to the body of individuals representing senior management.
This approach effectively balances the benefits of: (1) the court’s
familiarity with determining the mental states of individuals, (2) the
jury’s likely ability to better understand and consistently apply
corporate culpability from the perspective of a body of individuals
using Laufer’s suggested nonsubjective culpability inferences, (3) the
consideration of evidence reflecting genuine organizational
culpability, and (4) the integration of organizational culpability into
the standing criminal statues employing grades of culpability.

corporate ethos standard is more fact-sensitive than are the current standards of liability”).
239 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 78.
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The use of senior management action and intention as a proxy for
corporate action and intention is well-supported by the understanding
of management’s role in corporate deviance. In order to ensure that
this model does not embody the disconnect between individual and
corporate action and culpability inherent to vicarious liability, it is
crucial that it require a strong connection between the action and
intention of management and the organization, or what Laufer refers
to as organizational “authorship.” 240 The inherently tight relationship
between the actions of senior management and organizational
misbehavior reveals that adoption of the perspective of senior
managers, particularly top executives, provides for this authorship.
Top executives have long been viewed as the central force behind
corporate wrongdoing. In fact, one group of scholars points
exclusively to senior management as the impetus of corporate
deviance, defining corporate violence as “behavior producing an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to consumers, employees, or other
persons as a result of deliberate decision-making by corporate
executives or culpable negligence on their part.” 241 Although it may
be unrealistic to lay the entire blame for corporate deviance on top
management, the recurring understanding is that management plays
the leading role in unethical and illegal corporate behavior.242 Thus,
the consensus view emerging in academia is that “corporate
wrongdoing is more often the result of actions or inactions, deliberate
or inadvertent, by the top managers of the organization.” 243
At the same time, an effective standard must account for the fact
that the influence of those in top management often trickles down
from the highest ranks into the ranks of lower-senior and middle
management, either deliberately or inadvertently, in the form of
expectations and objectives driven at profit maximization, 244
240 Id. at 73 (“The strength of authorship determines the reasonableness of [imputing the
actions of agents to the corporation].”).
241 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting John Monahan et al., Corporate Violence: Research Strategies for Community
Psychology, in CHALLENGES TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 117 (Daniel Adelson &
Theodore Sarbin eds., 1979)).
242 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 59 (observing that “superiors [are
consistently] ranked as the primary influence in unethical decisionmaking”); id. at 60 (citing
confidential interviews conducted with a number of board chairmen and senior executives and
observing a consensus that “the top management, particularly the chief executive officer, sets
[the] ethical tone”); LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125 (arguing that “[o]f all internal factors
accounting for corporate crime, not one comes close in importance to the role of top
management in tolerating if not shaping a corporate culture that allows for deviance”).
243 Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate
Illegal Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138, 138–39 (1995).
244 See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 47 (“Nonetheless, the desire to increase
or maintain current profits is the critical factor in a wide range of corporate deviance . . . .”);
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permitting management to avoid positive knowledge of the deviance
below. 245 An understanding of this flow-through phenomenon is
crucial to ensuring consideration of the full range of evidence
probative of the SMMR. The SMMR accounts for this phenomenon
by using Laufer’s approach in considering the two critical sources of
organizational culpability: (1) the subjective knowledge of senior
management sufficiently connected to the organization, which reflects
organizational culpability; and (2) circumstantial evidence, in the
form of the factors contributing to genuine organizational culpability,
which provides for reasonable inferences of culpability amongst
senior management. 246 This approach effectively considers individual
managers’ subjective culpability while restricting their ability to
avoid liability by avoiding actual knowledge of deviance.
Of course, the SMMR requires a body of senior management
against which to present and consider evidence. Given the broad
range of corporate managerial structures, from closely held
organizations utilizing only a handful of senior managerial positions
to the decentralized multinational corporation operating numerous

Bucy, supra note 36, at 1134 (“[I]nstitutional goals can encourage, or discourage, illegal activity
by corporate employees.”).
245 The line between advertence and inadvertence of this trickle-down effect may be blurry,
as some argue that “it is not uncommon for top management to lose control and direct
supervision over subunits as well as subordinate employees once an organization reaches a
certain size, level of complexity, and specialization.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125. Clinard and
Yeager observe that the size of many large corporations:
[R]equires that corporations delegate decisionmaking and disperse their operating
procedures in order to produce efficiently. This process is accompanied by the
establishment of elaborate hierarchies based on authority position and functional
duties. In addition, over time the number of job categories requiring specialists or
professionals has expanded greatly as corporations have grown and technology has
developed. These factors—size, delegation, and specialization—combine to produce
an organizational climate that allows the abdication of a degree of personal
responsibility for almost every type of decision, from the most inconsequential to
one that may have a great impact on the lives of thousands.
CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 44.
On the other hand, armed with this defense of organizational complexity, management
has become adept at avoiding actual exposure to deviance of their subordinates, at least in terms
of its subjective knowledge of wrongdoing. See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 44
(“Executives at the higher levels can absolve themselves of responsibility by the rationalization
that illegal means of attaining their broadly stated goals had been devised without their
knowledge . . . .”); LAUFER, supra note 4, at 125 (“[T]op management can be quite successful in
demonstrating its ignorance of middle management or subordinate employee deviance.”).
246 Laufer emphasizes the utility of reasonable inferences of culpability, although he
frames the use of these inferences in terms of directly establishing a corporate mental state
under his theory of constructive corporate fault. See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (“Constructive
fault permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of culpability in
order to find corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced or inferred—with or
without the assistance of subjective evidence of the defendant.”).
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autonomous divisions, all of which may have multiple subdivisions
and tiers of high-level management, 247 a bright-line standard drawing
the line around an appropriate senior management group is virtually
impossible. In consideration of this difficulty, as an overriding
principle, the prosecution should be provided flexibility in selecting
the group about whose conduct and mens rea it will present evidence.
Although limits must be set in order to prevent the prosecution from
focusing on too low a level of management, or improperly focusing
too closely on the individual culpability of a small number of
managers, 248 the prosecution should be permitted to target its
presentation of evidence at a more manageable representative group
of management. Most importantly, this narrowing function will
permit the prosecution to direct the jury’s attention to the most
relevant group of management according to the locus of the deviance
and evidence of culpability. Absent this ability, it would likely be
easier for the defense to divert attention to an unduly broad
representative group or to a group substantially irrelevant to the
culpability determination.
As a lower limit, culpability may be considered from the
perspective of the level of senior management no lower than the level
that significantly participates in the development and implementation
of the strategic or operational policies and procedures of the
organization, or for the division or department of the organization in
which the level of management engages in its functions. Again, this
lower limit ensures that the culpability determination is only made
with reference to a body of management sufficiently representative of
the actions and intentions of the organization. The highest
management bracket, of course, consists of the highest executives and
the board of directors. But it bears emphasis that the prosecution
should be permitted to focus on the levels or divisions of management
most closely tied to the deviance.249 The understanding underlying
247 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 24 (describing the structural features of the
modern large corporation as pointed out by Drucker as being originated by General Motors,
which include “decentralization into autonomous divisions, each a business of its own; [and]
full responsibility of the divisional manager for the performance of his division . . . ”).
248 It may be appropriate for the prosecution to emphasize the individual culpability of a
small number of high-level managers, or even a single individual.
249 Presumably, the ability to trim the representative group on the high end will prove most
useful in prosecutions of complex, multi-divisional organizations where the deviance is focused
in one of the divisions. As a simple example, suppose Corporation X has two autonomous
divisions, A and B, each of which is run by a body of high-level executives. X is prosecuted for
fraud perpetrated within division B. The prosecution would, of course, present evidence
probative of culpability within division B, and absent any probative evidence of culpability
attributable to the higher ranks of X, would likely prefer to target the senior management of
division B. Without this ability, the defense would likely attempt to re-orient the jury by
presenting mitigating evidence based on the general policies of X, a lack of knowledge of the
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this ability to focus the analysis is that it is not necessary to prove that
the entire body of senior management is culpable as long as
culpability exists in a sufficiently representative management group.
Narrowing the representative group of senior management will not
compromise a proper assessment of genuine organizational
culpability. At first glance, it may appear as though this practice risks
taking a step back toward principles of vicarious liability by focusing
too closely on the culpability of a small group, or even on a single
individual. This is simply not the case. First, the determination of the
SMMR is not limited to individual knowledge, but will also consider
as circumstantial evidence the universe of organizational variables
understood to aggravate or mitigate organizational culpability, in
order to reach reasonable inferences of mens rea.250 And even where
an act is committed by a limited group of management, or even a
single senior manager, and the prosecution hinges heavily on
individual subjective culpability, the threshold classification as a
sufficiently senior manager ensures a close nexus between individual
and organization such that the organization is appropriately held
responsible for the act. This nexus is still present in cases where the
focus is shifted to lower-level managers because higher levels of
management, and ultimately, the organization, are impliedly culpable
for delegating managerial power and responsibilities. And presuming
that these lower levels of management are behaving in response to
pressures from above, not on exclusively individual motives, is
fair. 251 Consequently, due to this organization-agent connection, the
organization is itself blameworthy and appropriately held criminally
liable where the culpability for the deviance is focused among lowerranking senior management.
Inevitably, there will be an argument on both sides as to whether
or not a specific level of management or an individual is truly “senior
management.” But drawing this line is not central to the ultimate
liability determination. This exhibits an important implementation
advantage of this model. This model does not rely upon the murky,
yet make-or-break line-drawing between whether the acts and
intentions of an agent, or group of agents demonstrate an adequate
nexus to the organization or not, as is the case under the MPC

highest management of X, and other “mitigating” factors that fail in reality to mitigate the
culpability of the senior management of division B. This would only muddle and draw out an
already complex and long trial.
250 See infra Part III.C for a full discussion of the SMMR.
251 See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text (discussing the understanding that
deviance is commonly filtered down through the ranks from the most senior management).
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approach and Laufer’s standard of constructive fault. 252 Under the
SMMR model, the means of establishing this nexus is simplified, yet
is equally, if not more effective. Even if misconduct is focused among
a group of lower-ranked agents, or committed by an individual in a
position toeing the line of senior management, instead of engaging in
the unnecessarily painstaking task of drawing this line to attribute an
agent’s mental state (under the MPC) or move to the corporate mens
rea analysis (under Laufer’s constructive fault), the senior
management group can always be modified to provide some body of
individuals that can be examined for the requisite culpability. It will
be undeniably advantageous to the prosecution if an individual
heavily involved in the misconduct qualifies as a member of senior
management. But under the SMMR, this hair-splitting qualification
will never take precedence over the ultimately dispositive analysis of
organizational culpability. Avoiding this unnecessarily convoluted
line-drawing exemplifies one of the core utilities of this standard.
B. Senior Management Action
Requiring the factfinder to draw the arbitrary distinction as to
whether or not specific conduct is reasonably attributed to the
organization is neither practical nor necessary. Laufer’s analysis in
making this determination focuses on the strength of the agent-entity
relationship. 253 The reliance on this relationship makes sense: the
stronger the relationship between the agent and the entity, the more
the agent’s actions reflect the culture, policies, and procedures of the
organization and, in turn, the more just it is to hold the organization
liable for the agent’s conduct. This principle has long been embodied
in the MPC’s high managerial agent standard, 254 and should maintain
its place in the liability determination. The jury, however, should not
have to wade through the universe of organizational variables
contributing to an organization’s “authorship” of its agents’ actions.
A more workable standard for deriving organizational action is
reached, somewhat ironically, with inspiration from the respondeat
superior standard in its broad, seemingly catch-all state. 255 Under the
252 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962) (requiring that the offense be “authorized,
requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment”); supra Part II.C (describing Laufer’s standard requiring a finding of corporate
action, which must be derived from the balancing of a number of organizational factors to
determine the relationship between the agent and the entity).
253 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 73 (“The reasonableness test looks to the relationship of
the agent to the entity to determine [attribution].”).
254 See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the MPC standard.
255 Due to progressive expansion of the reach of respondeat superior, it essentially catches
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suggested standard, a corporation is presumed to have acted through
its senior management where any agent, or any group of agents,
performs the illegal activity while carrying out a job-related activity,
except where the agent or agents engage in illegal acts in which the
corporation is an intended victim of the activity for an exclusively
personal benefit. While inspired by respondeat superior, this broad
standard mends some of its flaws. It first removes the unnecessary,
hair-splitting distinction between what is and is not within an agent’s
scope of employment. In determining whether an agent was acting
within his authority while perpetrating the illegal act, both sides will
present evidence as to the company’s express and implied policies,
coupled with evidence of toleration, ratification, or encouragement of
the activity to prove that the agent was or was not acting within the
scope of his authority. This is precisely the type of evidence that will
be presented to prove the SMMR. So principles of authority are
implicitly embodied in the senior management culpability analysis. 256
As long as the corporation meets the required mental state through an
analysis of its genuine organizational culpability, it is appropriately
held liable for the actions of its agents, so a strict analysis of the
agent’s authority is superfluous. Additionally, this standard disposes
of the problematic “for the benefit of the corporation” with which
courts have consistently struggled. 257 And similar to the “scope of
employment” element, a corporate benefit will be impliedly
considered in determining the SMMR in certain circumstances;
specifically, it will be considered where senior management pressures
influence agents’ deviance. However, the corporate victimization

all acts committed while carrying out a job-related activity regardless of any real benefit to the
corporation. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (“There
have been many cases . . . in which the corporation is criminally liable even though no benefit
[to the corporation] has been received in fact.”); Developments, supra note 77, at 1250 (arguing
that the scope of employment requirement has evolved to mean “little more than that the act
occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a job-related activity”).
256 In response to critics’ claims that a liberal interpretation of the “scope of employment”
element is required to prevent corporations from avoiding liability through an express
prohibition on all illegal activity by the board of directors, Bucy asserts that the corporate ethos
standard does not disregard the “scope of employment” requirement, but instead, “is a rigorous
application of this requirement. If the ethos of the corporation encouraged the agent to commit
the illegal conduct, the agent’s acts are within her de facto authority. If the corporate ethos did
not encourage her acts, they are outside her authority.” Bucy, supra note 36, at 1148–49.
257 See id. at 1149 (“Even if courts wanted to stringently impose this requirement, it is
unclear how they could. It seems impossible to apply literally. For example, if an employee
takes bribes for favors to corporate customers, has the corporation benefitted? If so, how do the
courts measure the benefit? Do the disadvantages, such as poor relationships with other
customers, a criminal conviction, detrimental publicity, internal dissension, and poor morale,
outweigh the benefit?”).
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limitation quickly disposes of cases in which the agent targets the
corporation exclusively for his personal benefit. 258
Finally, this standard for determining corporate action is an
improvement over Laufer’s objective reasonableness analysis. Like
Laufer’s standard, the presumption of senior management action
involves the finding of a “constructive corporate act” 259 because it
derives corporate action from senior management’s development and
implementation of organizational policies, procedures, and strategy,
its delegation of authority, and its general management and oversight
of corporate operations. But this standard removes the risk that judges
and juries will stumble over the development and implementation of a
flexible (and likely bendable and breakable) factor-driven
reasonableness test to derive corporate action. Instead of requiring the
factfinder to undertake an entirely unfamiliar inquiry into the “size,
complexity, formality, functionality, decision-making process, and
structure of the corporate organization”260 to determine whether it is
reasonable to derive corporate action, their efforts should focus on
determining whether the agent’s actions and the surrounding
circumstances demonstrate the required level of culpability. At the
end of the day, the organization only acts through its agents,261 so
these acts should be treated as those of the corporation until it proves
that it is not culpable for them. Without compromising the substantive
merits of the consideration of the organizational variables
contributing to genuine corporate culpability, which will be
considered by a jury armed with a more concrete senior management
perspective, this model of corporate action provides a more workable
approach assuring that liability will not be dismissed without due
consideration of culpability as a result of an unduly complex standard
for determining corporate action.
C. The Senior Management Mens Rea
Under the SMMR, if the presumption of senior management action
is established, the factfinder must then determine the existence or
nonexistence of a concurrent mental state. The SMMR model builds
258 Clinard and Yeager refer to these such cases, where “a corporate official . . . gains a
personal benefit in the commission of a crime against the corporation . . . ” as occupational
crime, not corporate crime. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 18.
259 Laufer refers to action and intention under his model of constructive corporate fault as
“constructive corporate action” and “constructive culpability.” LAUFER, supra note 4, at 77.
260 Id. at 72.
261 See 1 WILLIAM MEAD FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 5 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (noting that one of the “distinguishing characteristics
of a corporation” is that it “is capable of acting through . . . its agents . . . ”).
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from the proposed schemes of genuine organizational culpability,
drawing its primary inspiration from Laufer’s incorporation of these
principles into the Model Penal Code mental states. 262 The SMMR
liability determination is made by considering whether senior
management, considering individual subjective knowledge and
reasonable inferences of culpability using circumstantial evidence
derived from facts and circumstances manifesting independent
organizational culpability, acted with purpose, knowledge,
recklessness or negligence with respect to the corresponding acts and
attendant circumstances required for conviction in the relevant
statute. 263 Using the understanding of independent organizational
culpability and the implementation-based necessity of the
incorporation of graded mental states, this standard adds an additional
implementation advantage through its focus on a tangible body of
individuals against which to consider evidence.
The model borrows, in large part, Laufer’s marriage of the
corporate agents’ subjective knowledge and objective manifestations
and reasonable inferences of organizational culpability. 264 The
underlying goal of this standard mirrors that of constructive corporate
fault—“[to] search . . . for the best possible estimation of a corporate
mental state through actual knowledge, as well as through reasonable
inferences.” 265 But it does so in a more practical manner by shifting
away from Laufer’s idealistic assumption that judges and juries can
wade through the complexities of the corporate form to make
consistent, well-reasoned objective determinations as to the mental
state of the abstract corporate “person.” Under SMMR, the estimation
of the corporate mental state is reached through an examination of the
actual knowledge of senior managers and the use of factors
contributing to organizational culpability as circumstantial evidence
of their culpability. The SMMR analysis will use, in large part, the
general organizational variables and examples of evidence probative
of the respective levels of corporate culpability in the existing
conceptualizations of genuine organizational culpability. 266
262 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of current proposed models of genuine
organizational culpability.
263 The respective grades of culpability maintain the MPC definitions of the respective
grades of culpability. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text (purpose); notes 220–23
and accompanying text (knowledge); note 224–29 and accompanying text (recklessness); note
230–32 (negligence).
264 See LAUFER, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the use of subjective and objective
inquiries into corporate culpability under Laufer’s model of constructive corporate fault).
265 Id.
266 See id. at 84–85 (summarizing the organizational variables and examples of evidence
proving the respective constructive mental states under Laufer’s model of constructive corporate
fault). Other examples of aggravating and mitigating evidence of culpability are summarized in
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The strong underpinnings of the use of objective, reasonable
inferences and approximations under this model bear further
emphasis. An exclusive reliance on the individual, subjective
culpability of senior managers, aside from being nearly factually
impossible, would compromise the merits of the standard. Laufer
defends the use of objective approximations of intent on the basis that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to derive a mental state by focusing on
individuals’ subjective thought processes using direct evidence. 267
But this difficulty is commonly overcome in the context of criminal
law through the use of reasonable inferences:
We are accustomed to this burden, however, and so do not
easily realize that, truly, direct proof of intent is impossible
and we have simply become comfortable with approximations
that do not overcome the impossibility of our task. . . .
However, our inability to directly prove intent does not cause
us to reject the entire concept, or given sufficient
circumstantial evidence, to question whether the factfinders
have accurately deduced a person’s intent.268
When framed against the criminal law’s attempts at the factually
impossible, it is evident that the suggested use of approximations to
ascertain the “mental state” of a group of management is not a
departure from principles of individual subjective determinations of
mens rea, but instead, a continuation of the practical necessity of
balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstantial evidence to reach
a comfortable estimation. Accordingly, the SMMR model gives the
factfinder the flexibility to consider senior management’s mental state
with reference to circumstantial evidence using the body of factors
contributing to organizational culpability. This, in turn, enables a
reasonable approximation as to whether senior management acted
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Thus, the use of
objective inferences to deduce a SMMR gives full effect to the
consideration of the organizational variables contributing to
independent organizational culpability.

the discussion of Bucy’s corporate ethos standard, supra text accompanying notes 125–30, and
in the summary of the factors which prosecutors are urged to consider before seeking an
indictment of an organization. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
267 LAUFER, supra note 4, at 87 (“[O]ne primary rationale for resorting to reasonableness
judgments in determining culpability . . . is the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of
establishing subjective mental processes by direct evidence.”).
268 Bucy, supra note 36, at 1178 (emphasis added).
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The aim of SMMR is, of course, a close estimation of the
organization’s mental state—it is an approximation of senior
management’s culpability as a body, and thus will not reflect a perfect
assessment of every senior manager’s individual culpability.
Accepting this imperfection is crucial to properly implementing this
model. Certainly, proof of culpable mental states among those
individuals in the highest ranks of an organization will weigh heavily
in the culpability assessment because those individuals bear the
closest nexus to the will of the organization.269 Similarly, the scope of
the culpability analysis will be necessarily focused where deviance is
focused in a division of the organization which is directly overseen by
a concentrated group of senior managers or where misconduct is
actually committed by such a group. 270 But courts must be careful to
avoid falling into the constraints inherent to the strict imputation of
individual mental states by maintaining the central understanding of
this model—culpability of individual agents, in many instances, is
only a piece of the SMMR and is not a prerequisite to its finding.
Accordingly, the presence of evidence aggravating the culpability of
senior management, and ultimately the organization, inevitably will
not speak to the subjective mental state of every involved senior
manager with respect to the deviance.
For example, assume that agents in middle management commit a
fraud, and the prosecution seeks to prove knowledge of the acts on the
part of twenty senior managers. The central evidence of senior
management’s knowledge is that five senior managers responsible for
the oversight of the subordinate agents appeared to turn a blind eye or
failed to properly enforce controls preventing the misconduct of
subordinates, and that the corporation exhibited a history of similar
misconduct. Not every manager tolerated the misconduct, and it is
possible that not every manager even knew that his or her colleagues
tolerated the misconduct, or knew of the history of deviance.
Although this is a simplified example, it would not be inappropriate
for a jury to reasonably infer, considering these failures within the
ranks of senior management, taken in light of management’s general
responsibility to be informed of and control the conduct of
269 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (supporting the Model Penal Code’s use
of the high managerial agent standard) and Part III.A (describing the tight relationship between
top management and corporate deviance). For example, it may, in many circumstances, be
appropriate to convict a corporation where the Chief Executive Officer, or a similarly senior
officer, alone engages in the misconduct with the required mental state because that individual is
so closely connected with the organization, and is so representative of “senior management” that
his actions and intentions are appropriately attributed to the organization.
270 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the justifications for this ability to narrow the
focus to the group of senior management most closely connected to the deviance.
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subordinates, that senior management acted with knowledge through,
among other potential factors, its toleration, lack of oversight, failure
to implement proper controls, and express or implied pressures on
subordinates.
The core utility of the SMMR approach over Laufer’s model stems
from judges’ and juries’ abilities to think about the corporate “mental
state” of a body of individuals who are capable of forming mental
processes, rather than of a corporation. To presume that the courts,
and more questionably, jurors, will truly be able to accept and analyze
the corporation, an intangible, abstract entity, as an independently
thinking “person” amenable to the application of a mental state, is
simply too far of a logical leap. Even if courts can overcome this
cognitive barrier, to also assume that the factfinder can wade through
the expanse of culpability evidence, considering the differences in
size, complexity, and functionality of organizations, to come up with
consistent determinations as to whether intangible entities acted
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently is an even further
stretch. At the end of the day, it is easier to think about the thought
processes of a group of individuals making decisions for the
organization, and to ascribe a mental state to that group, than it is to
do the same of the elusive abstraction that is the corporate person. By
shifting the task to making an SMMR determination, the jury is
armed with a more familiar perspective against which to approximate
a mental state, a body of tangible, thinking, decision making
individuals.
At the same time, this shift maintains the other substantive and
implementation advantages of Laufer’s model. It avoids the
overinclusiveness of vicarious liability271 by considering genuine
organizational culpability. This culpability is understood by focusing
on the subjective culpability of senior managers bearing a close
relationship to the action and intention of the organization, and by the
use of the accepted factors contributing to organizational culpability
as circumstantial evidence of senior management’s mens rea. On the
other hand, it skirts the underinclusiveness 272 by avoiding reliance on
individually culpable agents. Further, SMMR is an improvement over
the courts’ attempts at aggregating individual pieces of culpability
under the collective knowledge doctrine,273 which neglects a proper
consideration of the agent-entity relationship and of the expanse of
271 See supra Part I.B.6 (discussing the over- and underinclusiveness of the current
scheme).
272 See id..
273 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the law’s attempts to incorporate genuine culpability
through the collective knowledge doctrine).
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variables contributing to genuine organizational culpability. These
substantive strengths are achieved in a model capable of integration
into the standards of graded culpability used in the existing criminal
law.
D. SMMR in Action
Because most of the utility of the standard over Laufer’s
constructive culpability model stems from its streamlined analysis
and implementation, the liability results should closely match those
hypothesized by Laufer. 274 The Arthur Andersen obstruction of
justice case provides a useful set of facts against which to test this
model. Again, at issue was whether an Andersen agent “‘knowingly,
intentionally and corruptly persuade[d] . . . [other Andersen
employees] with intent to cause’ them to withhold documents from,
and alter documents for use in . . . ‘regulatory and criminal
proceedings and investigations.’” 275
The conviction generally turned on Andersen’s document retention
procedures when the Enron accounting scandal came to a head in
August of 2001. On August 14, a senior Enron accountant gave three
warnings of the oncoming trouble: one to Enron CEO Kenneth Lay,
one to David Duncan, the head partner of Andersen’s Enron
“engagement team” (the group of personnel responsible for
Andersen’s auditing and consulting services), and one to Duncan’s
supervisor and fellow partner, Michael Odom. 276 Andersen had ample
reason from the start to expect an SEC investigation due to its June
2001 SEC settlement in connection with its audit work for Waste
Management, Inc., under which it was effectively placed on probation
with the SEC. 277 The Enron scandal publicly surfaced in the Wall
Street Journal in late August, and the SEC promptly opened an
informal investigation. 278 By early September, Andersen had formed
an Enron “‘crisis response’” team, which included a number of highlevel partners and Andersen in-house counsel, and on October 8,
Andersen retained outside counsel to represent it in litigation resulting
from its involvement with Enron. 279 In early October, Odom held a
274 See supra Part II.C for a summary of the standards and an application of Laufer’s
constructive culpability. Again, the goal of the suggested modifications is to avoid undue
complexity and the risk of improper and inconsistent application, which the author contends,
may create an unnecessarily high probability of unintended liability results.
275 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005) (citation omitted).
276 Id. at 698–99.
277 Brief for the United States at 2–3, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696
(2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080.
278 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 699.
279 Id.; see also Brief for the United States at 3, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544

1/5/2012 3:02:17 PM

326

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

training meeting with eighty-nine Andersen employees, including ten
from the Enron engagement team, and informed all to adhere to the
firm’s document retention policy, which stated that “[i]n cases of
threatened litigation, . . . no related information will be destroyed . . .
[and] separately . . . that, if [Andersen] is advised of litigation or
subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related information
should not be destroyed.” 280 However, Odom added: “[i]f it’s
destroyed in the course of [the] normal policy and litigation is filed
the next day, that’s great . . . . [W]e’ve followed our own policy, and
whatever there was that might have been of interest to somebody is
gone and irretrievable.” 281
The high probability of an Enron-related investigation and
litigation was expressly recognized by Nancy Temple, an Andersen
in-house counsel working on the crisis response team, in notes taken
at an October 9 meeting with other in-house counsel. 282 On October
20, after receiving a letter from the SEC to Enron notifying it that it
had opened an informal investigation in August, Andersen’s counsel
emphasized in a conference call that the Enron crisis-response team
follow the retention policy. 283 After the call, Duncan met with other
Andersen partners on the engagement team and advised them to
ensure that team members were complying with the retention
policy. 284
Duncan’s advice to stick to the retention policy fanned throughout
the organization. Partners held smaller meetings with subordinates
discussing the SEC investigation and confirming the need for
compliance with the destruction policy to the extent that, as the
government contended, “[m]embers of the Enron engagement team
were instructed to make document destruction a priority.” 285

U.S. 696 (2005) (No.04–368) 2005 WL 738080.
280 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 700 n.4 (quotations and citations omitted).
281 Id. at 700 (quotation and citation omitted).
282 Her notes acknowledged that “some SEC investigation” was “highly probable,” that
there was a “reasonable possibility [that the accounting practices at issue] will force a
restatement” of Enron’s financial statements, and that there was a “probability of charge of
violating [the injunction] in Waste Management.” Brief for the United States at 3–4, Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
283 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 700–01.
284 Id. at 701.
285 Brief for the United States at 7, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696
(2005) (No. 04–368) 2005 WL 738080 at *7. In fact, one Andersen partner instructed a manager
that it was so crucial to clean up files because “we may be subpoenaed,” and another employee
stated in an e-mail to other employees that the order to destroy documents “came from a partner
group and is considered VERY important.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similar
instructions went out to other offices handling Enron matters. Id. at 7–8.
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Throughout this period, despite the inevitable litigation, Andersen
continued substantial destruction of electronic and paper documents.
On one occasion, a fellow Andersen partner warned Duncan of the
impropriety of continued destruction, and on another, during a
meeting with a forensics investigator concerning his document
retention practices, Duncan shredded a document labeled “smoking
gun” stating “we don’t need this.” 286 At trial, the government
produced an exhibit depicting the time and quantity of documents
shredded at the Andersen’s main Houston office, showing that
destruction remained relatively steady throughout the time during
which the Enron turmoil surfaced, but spiked five-fold on October
25. 287 Finally, on November 9, Duncan’s secretary circulated an email
stating that Andersen had been served a subpoena for records, and per
Duncan’s instruction, there was to be no further shredding. 288
Under the senior management model, the required senior
management action is present. Again, a corporation is presumed to
have acted through senior management where any agent, or group of
agents has performed an illegal activity while carrying out a jobrelated function except where the corporation is the intended victim
of the conduct. The actions of the Andersen agents involved were
clearly not undertaken with personal benefits in mind, but instead, to
stick to protocol, or more likely, to cover Andersen’s tracks.
The mens rea analysis under these circumstances reflects the
pragmatic advantages of the SMMR model over the strict imputation
standard used at trial and in the subsequent appeals. A conviction
under the current liability scheme required the government to prove
that one of the agents involved knowingly and corruptly persuaded
others to engage in document destruction, which under the Supreme
Court’s statutory interpretation, required consciousness of the
wrongdoing. 289 Aside from the difficulties presented by this
interpretive issue, the jury initially battled the dilemma as to its ability
to convict based on a “patchwork verdict”—that is, a conviction
reached where the jurors “agree that the accused has done something
illegal,” but can reach no consensus on a single agent possessing the
requisite mental state. 290 The SMMR model avoids the difficulties
286 Arthur

Andersen, 544 U.S. at 701 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544
U.S. 696 (2005).
288 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 702.
289 See id. at 705–06 (holding that because the “natural meanings” of the terms
“knowingly” and “corruptly” are “normally associated with awareness, understanding, or
consciousness” that “[o]nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly [and]
corruptly persuad[e]’”).
290 Stacey Nuemann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the
287 United
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presented by the individualistic constraints of respondeat superior.
Instead of chasing the subjective culpability of an individual agent,
the jury would consider Andersen’s culpability from the broader
perspective of senior management, as a group, using the subjective
knowledge of those senior managers tied to the misconduct, as well as
evidence of other organizational variables aggravating and mitigating
senior management’s culpability.
The first step in the analysis is to frame the representative senior
management group. Although the extent of agents involved and the
precise responsibilities of each individual is not clear from the
reported facts, it is likely that the presentation of evidence would
focus heavily on the involvement of Duncan, Odom, and Temple, all
of whom appear to satisfy the definition of senior management due to
their high-level, apparently supervisory responsibilities, and who
were closely involved with document retention procedures. In
addition, the testimony of other senior partners and sufficiently senior
agents involved with the Enron matter, up to the highest-ranked
Enron executives, would be presented in attempts by the prosecution
and defense to respectively aggravate and mitigate the evidence of
senior management’s knowledge of the corrupt persuasion. But based
on the facts at hand, the actions and intent of Duncan, Odom, and
Temple would be the most prominent in the SMMR determination.
The case likely presents circumstances worthy of a conclusion that
senior management acted to knowingly persuade Andersen employees
to obstruct justice. Because a conviction is possible absent proof of an
individually culpable agent, the jury would consider the
organization’s urgency to continue extensive document destruction,
which was unarguably triggered by senior management’s awareness
of the imminent investigation. Certainly, a jury would heavily weigh
the actions of Duncan, Odom, and Temple due to their close nexus to
the deviance. The jury could also more broadly consider the actions
and intentions of senior management as the turmoil escalated to be at
a level roughly approximating knowledge that an investigation and
litigation was on the horizon. The jury could further assume that its
instructions were rooted in corrupt motives given its knowledge that
Andersen would soon be under investigatory scrutiny. The
prosecution would likely attempt to aggravate the SMMR by
presenting management’s involvement in the recent Waste
Management litigation to prove its knowledge of the importance of
document retention during the early stages of investigation as a means

Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (2004).
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to demonstrate that management knew it was attempting to cover
Andersen’s tracks as soon as the scandal surfaced. Finally, the
prosecution could point to the company’s failure to have adequate
controls in place to ensure document retention as further aggravating
evidence. This culpability can be traced all the way up to the most
senior levels of management, because executives were certainly
aware of the imminence of the Enron turmoil and at least had to have
raised an eyebrow at or turned a blind eye to management’s relentless
document shredding, and thus failed to use their authority to ensure
proper retention. Accordingly, even assuming the lack of required
knowledge on the part of any individual agent as determined by the
Supreme Court, it would be proper for a jury to hold that senior
management acted knowingly.
The model is equally applicable and effective on a smaller scale.
Recall, for example, Life Care Centers, 291in which a nursing home
was prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter arising from a patient’s
falling death which occurred because an administrative employee
accidentally removed a physician’s order from the patient’s charts
which said that the patient was required to wear a security bracelet
preventing her from leaving the building on her own. The employee
mistakenly removed the bracelet based on a misinterpretation of the
nursing home’s director’s instructions to “clean up” the treatment
charts. 292 On the night of the death, the decedent’s unit was shortstaffed, so a replacement nurse, unfamiliar with the decedent’s course
of treatment, did not check for the bracelet because of the absence of
the order in the patient’s treatment charts and because the
replacement nurse was not otherwise informed of the omission by the
patient’s regular nurses. 293
In this instance, as will be typical under this model, corporate
action is present due to the lack of victimization of the organization.
Involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts law would require a
reckless SMMR as to the patient’s death. 294 It is unclear from the
facts just how far down the ladder the representative senior
management group would extend in this case, but it is likely that
those individuals relevant to the analysis will include the nursing
home director, and potentially any other senior administrators or
291 Commonwealth

v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Mass. 2010).
at 209.
293 Id. at 210.
294 See id. at 212 (“Conviction of involuntary manslaughter requires more than negligence
or gross negligence . . . . The act causing death must be undertaken in disregard of probable
harm to others in circumstances where there is a high likelihood that such harm will result.”)
(citations omitted).
292 Id.
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nurses exercising policy and procedure making discretion. In this
case, the prosecution would focus its proof of recklessness on senior
management’s failure to implement adequate policies and procedures
relating to the management of patients’ charts, staffing, and
communication with nurses in a manner demonstrating deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the patient. 295 The
absence of policies and procedures for the management and cleanup
of medical charts would be a significantly aggravating factor. This
absence would further raise culpability if there had been instances of
similar mishaps involving medical charts causing patient
mistreatment in the past. The prosecution could bolster its argument
for a reckless SMMR by focusing on the short-staffing if this decision
can be traced back to senior management, especially if there is a
history of similar staffing decisions. Finally, because the nursing
home director was so closely tied to the medical chart misstep, the
prosecution may rely heavily on his manner of delegation as a source
of deliberate inattention to a substantial risk of harm due to his
extremely general instructions given to an individual apparently
unfamiliar with proper chart management. There is no precise recipe
for the number and strength of these and other pieces of aggravating
evidence required to support a conclusion of recklessness on the part
of senior management. But armed with the definition of recklessness
and a body of individuals against which to consider the relevant
actions and omissions, a jury could weigh the substantiality of the risk
taken to reach a reasoned estimation as to whether senior
management acted recklessly with respect to the patient’s death.
CONCLUSION
The corporate criminal law’s adherence to individualistic standards
of vicarious liability, imputing the mens rea of individual corporate
agents, is unjustifiably defective. The current liability scheme’s
failure to consider the independence of individual and organizational
culpability has created an unnecessarily large risk of over- and
underinclusive application of the criminal liability to organizations.
Distinct, genuine organizational culpability has long been
acknowledged, but has only been incorporated, albeit inadequately,
into the criminal law through federal prosecutorial and judicial
sentencing guidelines. Under the present model, the corporation is
essentially strictly liable in the eyes of the law, and only able to
defend itself at the indictment and sentencing stages. At that point
295 Evidence of this nature was not presented in the Court’s summary of facts, likely due to
its irrelevance to the analysis, the prosecutions failure to raise it at trial, or its absence entirely.
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prosecutorial and judicial discretion reign free, permitting the
government and judges to flexibly consider the organization’s actual
culpability in the offense using a malleable group of factors, many of
which focus on the organization’s post-offense conduct. Although
generally substantively sound, the foremost proposals for
incorporating genuine organizational culpability into liability
standards exhibit implementation-related flaws risking unintended
liability results, compromising their normative merits. Building from
the substantive wisdom of these proposals, the proposed SMMR
approach ensures the consideration of genuine organizational
culpability in a framework that can be seamlessly integrated into the
graded culpability scheme of our criminal statutes, and, using the
familiar humanistic perspective of “senior management” courts and
juries may consistently implement, understand, and apply.
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